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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 47, MARCH 1973 NUMBER 3
STANDING TO SUE IN NEW YORK
WILM,,, J. QUm*
INTRODUCTION
In 1963, the New York Court of Appeals announced:
We have always held that the constitutionality of a State statute
may be tested only by one personally aggrieved thereby . . . an
unaggrieved citizen-taxpayer, such as appellant, lacks standing
to challenge a statute's constitutional validity.'
New York, by this stark expression of the "no taxpayer standing"
rule, took a position not shared by any of its sister states.2 New York
adopted this strict rule while the federal restraints of the Mellon case
were being loosened by the Supreme Court.3 Indeed, since 1872, New
*Associate Professor of law, University of South Carolina, A.B. 1956 Princeton
University; LL.B 1959, University of Virginia.
1 St. Clair v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc. 13 N.Y.2d 72, 73, 192 N.E.2d 15, 15-16, 242
N.Y.S.2d 43, 44 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 970 (1964).
2 New Mexico is a possible compatriot but its position seems arguable. State ex rel.
Castillo Corp. v. New Mexico St. Tax Comm'n, 79 N.M. 357, 443 P.2d 850 (1968).
3Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1928). Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
In Flast, the government argued that Frothingham "announced a constitutional
rule" compelled by article III limitations (requirement of a case or controversy)
and the doctrine of separation of powers. The taxpayer, on the other hand,
argued that Frothingham expressed only a "policy of judicial self-restraint."
The Court found that the case "rests on something less than a constitutional
foundation". More recently, the Court reiterated that the standing issue did
not involve the cases and controversies clause of article HI but was only a
question of statutory interpretation. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
In New York, the St. Clair decision found that the standing doctrine was required
by the constitutional separation of powers. A review of the earlier New York
law, however, will show that standing had been regarded as an administrative
convenience rather than a constitutional issue prior to the 1963 decision.
While the federal law of standing has plainly been liberalized its present status is
hardly stable or satisfactory. The issue continues to consume the time of the Supreme
Court, as well as the lower courts, which could more profitably be spent on issues of
substance. The following four positions are set out to focus the problem:
I. Frothingham-The Frothingham position, as well as St. Clair, has the advantage
of substantial clarity. It is held that only an aggrieved party can test the constitutional
validity of governmental action and, more importantly, that a mere taxpayer is not
an aggrieved party. As a consequence, the spending power is immune from test. This
seems to have been the precise intent of Frothingham. (See note 12 infra). Other types
of statutes, and exercises of power, are apt to turn up an aggrieved party in the
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York has freely permitted taxpayer suits against city and other local
officials to prevent "any illegal official act."
Frothingham sense. The only area for dispute is what type of hurt, other than taxes,
will result in aggrievement. The Frothingham position is widely viewed, although not
by the Supreme Court, as resting on a constitutional foundation. The remaining three
positions view standing as a policy issue rather than a constitutional one.
IL "Specific" Constitutional Violations- The rule of Flast seems to be that a
taxpayer has standing if he alleges violation of "specific" constitutional prohibitions.
The Establishment Clause was held specific in Flast. The distinction between specific and
general prohibitions is difficult and the purpose of the distinction is not clear.
MI. Judicial Discretion- This view holds that a plaintiff, without a "protected
interest," does not have a right to judicial review but that a court, in its discretion, may
review the legal issue if it considers review to be in the public interest. Jaffe, Standing
Again, 84 HARv. L. REv. 633 (1971). The meaning of "protected interest" is not precise
but would apparently not include a mere taxpayer. Standing would thus largely be left
to judicial discretion, a result unsatisfactory to those who have become distrustful of
government.
IV. Standing for any Injury-in-Fact-By this view any injury-in-fact, including
the payment of taxes, gives a right to review. Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Other, 35
U. Cm. REv. 601 (1968). Injury in fact is considered to essentially mean economic harm,
even if that harm be only a "trifle." Id. It is recognized that in Baker v. Carr the Court
found standing based on the dilution of one vote. However, under this view, an unag-
grieved person is held to have no standing. Certainly, this position, permitting taxpayer
suits, is sufficient for most purposes. But the following examples may indicate the need
for standing without restraints. Assume,
(1) A Senator believes that the executive is illegally impounding appropriated
funds in violation of Article II, section 3; or
(2) A Senator believes that the executive has performed an illegal "pocket veto"
of legislation when Congress has recessed rather than adjourned as provided
in Article I, section 7; or
(3) A citizen believes that a federal office lease has been awarded to a high
bidder in a corrupt manner (assume that no unsuccessful bidder considers
it expedient to pursue the matter); or
(4) A citizen believes that the government has failed to prosecute an apparent
viblation of campaign contribution laws.
(5) A citizen believes that the anti-trust laws are not being vigorously or
consistently enforced by the Department of Justice.
Taxpayer standing is insufficient in these examples since in (1) the objection is not
to illegal spending but to illegal non-spending; in (2) additional spending may also be
involved depending on the nature of the bill vetoed; in (3) the objection is not to the
expenditure but to the illegal selection process; and in (4) the disputed contributions
are not public funds.
In these examples, is it a fair or honest answer to the Senator or citizen to say you
are unaggrieved, you have no standing, the courts are closed to you, your proper and
only recourse is political, you should make efforts to vote the bad people out. Does
our system require this answer? The citizen's complaint, after all, is not political, it is
that the Constitution and laws are not being enforced.
V. Free Standing-The last position would permit any citizen to secure judicial
review for the alleged governmental violation of the Constitution or statutes. Under
this view, nothing is to be feared from judicial review.
Almost all discussions of standing are based on the unstated premise that dark
forces will be unloosed if the doctrine is simply eliminated. It may be that the worst
that will happen is that the Constitution and laws will be interpreted and enforced.
Despite repeated efforts, after almost forty years, the legality of the TVA has not been
determined. Neither, again despite repeated efforts and after almost ten years, has the
legality of the war in Vietnam.
4 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 51 (McKinney 1965). This provision originated in an 1872
law (Act of April 2, 1872, Laws of New York ch. 161 (1872)).
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During recent years two traditional areas of state jurisdiction,
criminal procedure and equal apportionment, have been largely pre-
empted by Supreme Court interpretations of the fourteenth amend-
ment. As a consequence, the state courts have been effectively reduced
to jurisdiction over private litigants and the enforcement of the non-
criminal provisions of state constitutions. 5 It might be expected that a
state court would be protective of its remaining powers. New York
on the contrary, by the St. Clair decision, 6 substantially granted away
its state constitutional jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals became
thereby an essentially non-public institution.
The Court of Appeals stated in St. Clair that "[w]e have always
held" that a citizen - taxpayer lacks standing. A review of New York's
constitutional history, however, shows that many of the state's major
cases have been brought by persons not personally aggrieved.7
The 1963 St. Glair decision is, consequently, fascinating in that
all indications pointed to an opposite result. The decision adopted
restraints against citizen actions (1) not found necessary by the rest
of the states; (2) not found necessary by the cities and localities of New
York; (3) while the federal law of standing was becoming more liberal;
(4) while the court's jurisdiction had been sharply narrowed by the
federal courts' and (5) not compelled by its o'vn history.
Restraints on citizen standing to sue have been justified by a
number of expressed rationales. Most commonly these include (1) a
fear of multiplicity of suits," (2) a fear of judicial tyranny through the
"supervision" of the legislative and executive branches9 and (3) the
5The significant issues of state constitutional interpretation generally focus on the
fiscal powers, i.e. budget-making, spending, taxing and borrowing.
6 13 N.Y.2d 72, 192 N.E.2d 15, 242 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 970 (1964).
7 See section I.
8 Doolittle v. Supervisors of Broome County, 18 N.Y. 155, 163 (1858).
9 This was the sole stated reason given in St. Clair. The court quoted from an earlier
decision, Schieffelin v. Komfort, 212 N.Y. 520, 530, 106 N.E. 675, 677 (1914), as follows:
Jurisdiction has never been directly conferred upon the courts to supervise
the acts of other departments of government .... the assumption of jurisdiction
in any other case [than one involving a personally aggrieved party] would be an
interference by one department with another department of government when
each is equally independent within the powers conferred upon it by the Con-
stitution itself.
St. Clair v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 13 N.Y.2d 72, 76, 192 NXE.2d 15, 16, 242 N.Y.S.2d 43,
45 (1963). A contrary view was taken by Hamilton in Federalist No. 78 where he wrote:
Mhe judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least
dangerous to the political rights of the constitution; .... Mhe executive not
only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature
not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and
rights of every citizen are to be regulated . .. [t]he judiciary is beyond com-
parison the weakest of the three departments of power; that it can never attack
with success either of the other two; and that all possible care is requisite to
enable it to defend itself against their attacks.
Tim FEDERAI=S No. 78, at 483-84 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton).
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necessity of an aggrieved party in an adversary context to properly
bring out the issues. 10
These stated rationales are self-refuting and are of only slight
interest in an analysis of the standing question. More to the point
is a study of the merits of those cases where the courts have refused
to exercise their review power. The central fact is that a court's finding
of no standing is a decision in favor of the challenged governmental
action. This is evident to all concerned and raises the question, why
does the court take this indirect and misleading route when it could
simply hold for the government on the merits? The beginning point,
as noted, is that the court, for various reasons, prefers not to interfere
with the executive or legislative action. The court desires to avoid
a written opinion for two major reasons: (1) there is little or no merit
in the govexnment's position," or (2) while meritorious, the govern-
ment's position would require such a broad holding that the court is
apprehensive about adopting it.12
10 In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) the Supreme Court noted that the "gist
of the question of standing" is:
Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the con-
troversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions?
The premise of this point is that only a personally injured party can be relied upon
to vigorously contest the government's position. The premise is probably wrong and the
situation is surely not aided by a rule which denies everyone the right to contest the
governmental action. The point is, however, related to a matter of legitimate concern. If
a taxpayer brings an action and mishandles the litigation it would seem that stare
decisis would foreclose other taxpayers from bringing a similar action. This probably
could be dealt with by requiring a publication when a taxpayer complaint is filed and
permitting joinder by others.
11 For example, the government's position might be contrary to a clear constitutional
prohibition.
12 The clearest example of this is Frothingham v. Mellon. 262 U.S. 447 (1928). Mrs.
Frothingham contested the validity of the Maternity Act of 1921, ch. 135 42 Stat. 224. The
act authorized appropriations "to be paid to the several States for the purpose of co-
operating with them in promoting the welfare and hygiene of maternity and infancy."
Id. § 1. The act created a new federal board and required the states to file "detailed
plans" for the approval of the board. Id. § 8. The states were further required to make
matching contributions equal to any federal appropriations received. Id. § 2. Mrs.
Frothingham took the position that the "appropriations are for purposes not national,
but local to the state." 262 U.S. at 479. Clearly, the enumerated powers granted Congress
by article I, section 8 do not come close to authorizing the act in question. But what of
clause 1 of section 8 which confers on Congress the "power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imports and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general
welfare?" A broad, or literal, reading of the general welfare clause would easily justify
appropriations for the health of mothers and infants. The Court was presented with the
central issue of American constitutional interpretation, the nature of the national govern-
ment. The Court said Mrs. Frothingham had no standing. Professor Corwin reports that
while the Constitution was pending some of its opponents charged that the "general
welfare" clause was designed in conjunction with the "necessary and proper" clause as a
"legislative joker" to vest Congress "with power to provide for whatever it might choose
[Vol. 47:429
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The standing issue is one of power and the structure of government.
Once a court adopts a clear no standing rule the legislature and
executive are free to interpret the constitution as they will. This is clear
from New York's experience and the development of the immune or
non-challengeable statute. Obviously enough, if a personally aggrieved
citizen is a prerequisite for judicial review a statute will be immune if
drafted to avoid the creation of such a person. This is simply done as
the following hypothetical case will show. The New York Constitution
prohibits the creation of any state debt without a vote of the people.' 3
Assume that the Governor and legislature desire to construct a massive
governmental and cultural complex in Albany which will require a
billion dollars of debt. Assume further that the proponents of the
program believe that the people have a different set of priorities and
will vote down such a bond issue if it is submitted to them. 4 This
is evidently a quandary. The debt is necessary for the construction, a
referendum is necessary for the debt, and there is no doubt that the
referendum will be defeated. But St. Clair removes the difficulty. The
legislature need only pass an immune statute providing, "[t]here is
hereby created a public corporation to be known as the South Mall
Authority which shall have responsibility for the construction of a
governmental complex in Albany. The authority is hereby authorized
to issue one billion dollars of debt." The use of a newly created public
corporation is not required by St. Clair. Under St. Clair the state could
itself borrow in contravention of the constitution in reliance upon
to regard as the general welfare by any means deemed by it to be necessary and proper."
E. CORWIN, Tim TWILcHT OF THE SupR.mE COURT 152 (1934) [hereinafter CoRwIN]. The
proponents of the Constitution repudiated this argument on the grounds, among others,
that "the suggested reading, by endowing Congress with practically complete legislative
power, rendered the succeeding enumeration of more specific powers superfluous." Id. 153.
Madison, in Federalist No. 41, labeled the opponent's argument a "misconstruction" and
maintained that the general welfare clause was not a substantive grant of power; that it
only meant the Congress could tax and spend with respect to the specific delegated
powers. Hamilton, to the contrary, later argued for a literal and consequently broad,
reading of the clause. In his Report on Manufactures he wrote:
The phrase is as comprehensive as any that could have been used. . . . [I]t
is therefore of necessity left to the discretion of the National Legislature to pro-
nounce upon the objects which concern the general welfare, and for which, under
that description, an appropriation of money is requisite and proper."
The subsequent history of the Madison-Hamilton dispute is found at CORIVIN 149-79.
13 N.Y. CoNsr. art. VII, § 11 (1954). This provision originated in the Constitution of
1846.
14 At this point the hypothetical merges into historical fact. It is reported that the
Governor and Albany County officials, in connection with the South Mall project, agreed
to evade the referendum requirement, "everybody having assumed from the first that
voters around the state would never approve a bond issue for a mall in Albany." FoRTUNE,
June 1971, at 94. Comptroller Levitt has referred to the constitutional evasion involved
in the South Mall financing as "the rankest kind of subterfuge." N.Y. Times, Nov. 17,
1972 at 51, col. 7.
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the "no standing" rule. This direct approach has not yet been taken,
presumably on the theory that it would be excessively flamboyant.
The hypothetical Authority bonds, however, lack security and are
unattractive to bond purchasers. The immune statute would, therefore,
further provide that "[t]he State of New York shall guarantee the
payment of Authority bonds."' 5 The bonds are thus made marketable
and the project proceeds to rise out of the Albany slums. Under St.
Clair, the only conceivably aggrieved persons are those whose property
is condemned by the Authority to clear the site. Of course, the Au-
thority can acquire by purchase rather than by condemnation. Also,
the Authority can select the site to avoid possibly intransigent owners.
Moreover, this class is implausible in the role of defender of the con-
stitution; it is apt to be easily disposed of by the payment of inflated
sums for slum properties."
This essentially has been the procedure followed in New York
over the past ten years.' . As of June 30, 1972 the state had outstanding
15 It is not to be reasonably argued that a guarantee is not "debt" within the mean-
ing of the constitution nor need it be so argued. It is sufficient if the statute is immune.
16 Paradoxically, the personally aggrieved standard simplifies the drafting process as
the number of persons to be deprived of their rights is increased, i.e. it is impossible to
draft a statute depriving Mr. X of his rights without personally aggrieving him but it
is not difficult to draft a statute which will deprive the public at large of its rights.
17The text hypothetical is only slightly oversimplified. In fact, the South Mall
scheme made use of a pre-existing entity, Albany County, in place of a new authority. In
place of the statutory state guarantee the South Mall approach used lease-financing to
provide the necessary state credit. Under this technique, the state is the tenant of a 40
year lease with Albany County the landlord. The state "rental payments to the county
are calculated to reduce county obligations progressively over the lease period." Schuyler
v. South Mall Constructors, 32 App. Div. 2d 454, 456, 503 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904 (3d Dep't
1969). As a South Mall prospectus puts it, the state's "rent" is an amount "sufficient to
pay when due all installments of principal of, and interest on, all bonds issued by the
County to finance the Project." Prospectus, County of Albany, New York, $70,000,000
South Mall Construction (Serial) Bonds, Series F, at 3 (August 1, 1971). By the end of
the "lease" term, all of the county bonds will have been retired and the buildings and
land will be conveyed to the state. In fact, the state's "lease" is a debt - a promise to
pay principal and interest on the construction bonds - and Albany County acts simply
as a conduit for the issuance and payment of state bonds.
[No use or expenditure of funds by the locality [Albany County] is actually
involved and the entire operation is underwritten by a State indemnification
against any "local" loss or expense. Investors in county bonds rely on the State's
credit which stands behind the rental and indemnity provisions of the South Mall
agreement.
Id. at 457, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 904. It is apparent that Albany County could not support the
borrowing since the expected Mall debt (one billion dollars) is almost twice the total
assessed valuation of taxable real property in Albany County ($546 million). South Mall
Prospectus at p. 11.
In his 1971 Annual Report Comptroller Levitt includes "Lease Purchase Obligations"
directly beneath "State Debt" under the general heading "Debt Data." N.Y. Dns'T OF
AuDrr AND CONTROL 1971 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER ii (1971). The Comptroller
reports $1.846 billion of outstanding lease purchase obligations as of March 31, 1971, id.
In 1963, at the time of St. Clair, there was outstanding $4 million of such debt. Id.
[Vol. 47:429
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Comptroller Levitt has stated that the South Mall financing "circumvents the constitu-
tional procedure which requires public approval of state debt by a voter referendum."
N.Y. Times, June 7, 1971 at 48, col. 2.
Lease-financing, therefore, is one major method of evading the referendum require-
ment. The second major method involves the use of an Authority and so-called "moral
obligation" debt. This evasion was pioneered by the Housing Finance Agency Act of
1960 (L. 1960 ch. 671) and has been subsequently emulated by the Urban Development
Corporation Act (L. 1968 ch. 174) and the Battery Park City Authority Act (L. 1968
ch. 343-44; L. 1969 ch. 624; and L. 1971 ch. 377). Under this method, an Authority is
created to undertake a project or series of projects. Conservative bond buyers, however,
consider the projects too risky (e.g., middle income housing) and the bonds are un-
marketable. Consequently, the statute provides that the state "shall" pay to the Authority
any amount needed for the authority's debt service reserve fund. Housing Finance Agency
Act - N.Y. Prarv. Hous. FIN. LAW. § 47 (1)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1972); Urban Develop-
ment Corporation - N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 6270 (3) (McKinney Supp. 1972); Battery
Park City Authority - N.Y. PuB. AurrH. Law § 1977-b. The language directing the state's
payment to the fund is mandatory. There is, of course, no distinction to be made be-
tween a direct guarantee of the bonds and a guarantee of a fund out of which the bonds
will be paid. The Comptroller classifies this type of debt as "Contingent Debt" of the
state and reports $1S.596 million outstanding as of March 31, 1971. 1971 ANNUAL REPORT
at 18. The Comptroller's characterization was apparently accepted by the Appellate
Division in Smith v. Levitt, 37 App. Div. 2d 418, 326 N.Y.S.2d 335 (3d Dep't 1971), aff'd,
30 N.Y.2d 934, 287 N..2d 380, 335 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1972). In its discussion of the Urban
Development Corporation statute, the court noted:
The enabling statutes do not expressly provide that the State is either
directly or secondarily liable on the obligations of UDC (cf. Public Authorities
Law §§ 369, 1813, 1819). However, an examination of the said enabling statutes
discloses in subdivision (3) of section 6270 that the State has obligated itself to
maintain adequate reserve funds to pay the amount of principal and interest
becoming due in each calendar year on all bonds of the UDC. Accordingly, the
bonds of UDC might be classified as contingent liabilities on the part of the
State of New York.
Id.at 421, 826 N.Y.S.2d at 338. In the court's language the "State has obligated itself" to
pay into the reserve fund, which makes UDC bonds "contingent liabilities on the part of
the State of New York." This also seems to be the belief of the financial community.
Asked why UDC bonds (AA) were rated higher than New York City bonds, (Baa) Mr.
Wade Smith, vice president of Moody's Investors Service, Inc., is reported as replying,
"the Urban Development Unit's better rating resulted from its guarantees by New
York State" (Dow Ticker, March 27, 1972, Phil Hawkins). The state's undertaking is
unlawful since it violates three separate constitutional prohibitions.
Article VII, § 11 (1938), the referendum requirement, provides that "no debt shall be
hereafter contracted by or in behalf of the state, unless such debt shall be authorized
by law" and approved by the people. Plainly, "no debt" includes "repayment guarantees"
and contingent liabilities.
The guarantee provision also violates Article VII, § 8, which prohibits the gift or
loan of the "credit of the state" in aid of any "public or private corporation:' This
provision was added by the 1938 Constitutional Convention since otherwise "an author-
ity . .. unable to sell its securities . . .could rush to the State for assistance." JouRNAL
op THE 1938 CoNvEimoN, Doc. No. 3. (For an example of what the draftsmen feared, see
Battery Park memorandum requesting a state guarantee because of a down-turn in the
real estate market. 1971 MCKNNEY'S SESSION LAWS at 2406). The draftsmen further noted
that the "committee feels strongly that the State's credit should be reserved for the use
of the State only." Id. The provision also violates Article X, § 5, which provides that
the state shall not "at any time be liable for the payment of any obligation issued by
such a public corporation....
Present defenders of the HFA pattern seem to take the position that despite the manda-
tory statutory language that state guarantee is not a guarantee at all. Bond counsel for
Battery Park, in their opinion letter, write that the guarantee,
does not bind or obligate the State Legislature to appropriate or obligate the
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State to apportion and pay to the Authority, in any future fiscal year, the amount
so certified by the chairman, but should a future Legislature elect to do so, it
may legally make such appropriation, in which event the State is legally autho-
rized to make such apportionment and payment.
Opinion of Messrs. Hawkins, Delafield & Wood, Prospectus, $200,000,000 Battery Park
City Authority (April 20, 1972).
This intriguing view, however, offers no explanation as to why mandatory language,
assuming it to be valid at all, does not "bind or obligate." Nor is any reference made to
section 1978 of the Battery Park statute which goes to some lengths to make all bond-
holder prerogatives binding upon subsequent legislatures. It provides:
The state of New York does pledge to and agree with the holders of the
bonds that the state will not. . . in any way impair the rights and remedies
of such bondholders until (all the bonds are discharged).
The "repayment guarantee" would seem to be the most significant right or remedy of a
bondholder and § 1978 purports to prohibit future legislatures from any action which
would "impair" such right. Its evident purpose is to create a vested right on behalf of
the bondholders. But, in the view of Battery Park bond counsel, the vested right is a
rather small right. The bondholders or the authority may petition the legislature re-
questing a special appropriation and the legislature may "elect" to make one. In fact,
this much of a "right" would seem to exist in the absence of any statutory provision.
How such a faint right can make otherwise unmarketable bonds marketable is puzzling.
Battery Park bond counsel adopts the elective appropriation approach in a salvage
operation to save the Battery Park statute. Counsel seems aware that the statute as en-
acted can not stand - without the aid of exotic interpretations - since the state
guarantee of authority debt violates both the constitutional referendum requirements
and the prohibition of the gift or loan of state credit. Counsel's salvage effort fails,
however, because the statutory language is unmistakably to the contrary. The effort
further fails because it is incorrect to say, "should a future legislature elect to do so, it
may legally make such appropriation." Article X, § 5, of the constitution was adopted in
1938 to make such an appropriation unlawful. It provides that neither the state nor any
political subdivision,
shall at any time be liable for the payment of any obligations issued by such a
public corporation heretofore or hereafter created, nor may the legislature
accept, authorize acceptance of or impose such liability upon the state or any
political subdivision thereof ....
Consequently, the Legislature is constitutionally prohibited from making payment on
authority bonds whether the statutory provision is mandatory, elective or non-existent.
Article X, § 5, was intended to overrule the Court of Appeals decision in Williamsburgh
Say. Bank v. State, 243 N.Y. 231, 153 N.E. 58 (1926). In Williamsburgh, the court imposed
liability, with legislative authorization, upon the state for the defaulted bonds of a
supposedly independent entity, the Canaseraga River Improvement District. The court
reasoned that although no legal liability existed, the state had created the District, set
it on its course, and could not, therefore, deny liability when the venture failed. In the
court's view, the state could not "stand unresponsive when asked to relieve those whom
indirectly at least it has brought into an unhappy predicament, by retiring obligations
which in essence and equity are it's own." Id. at 246, 153 N.E. at 63. If the bonds of an
independent river district were in "essence and equity" the state's a similar result seemed
inevitable in the case of authority bonds. The implied state liability of Williamsburgh
became more serious with the increasing use of the authority device during the 1930's.
By the time of the 1938 Constitutional Convention, the state had created 33 authorities.
Mr. Abbott Low Moffat, Chairman of the Convention's State Finance Committee, sought to
make clear that there should be no implied state liability for authority debt. In 1935, the
Court of Appeals had upheld the legality of an authority as a separate entity, indepen-
dent of the state that created it and free of the constitutional limits which restrain
government itself. Robertson v. Zimmerman, 268 N.Y. 52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935). Particularly,
an authority was free of the constitutional limits on the debt-making power - the
referendum requirement at the state level and debt limit provisions at the local level. If
one legislature could establish an independent authority to incur debt without a referen-
dum (Zimmerman) and a subsequent legislature could authorize state liability for the
[Vol. 47:429
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payment of such authority debt (Williamsburgh), the basic constitutional restraint was
pointless. The 1938 Convention probably did not consider the use of a Battery Park type
of guarantee as likely since such a guarantee would destroy the legality of the authority
under Zimmerman in addition to violating the referendum requirement. The Convention
was concerned with the "elective" action of a subsequent legislature. Moffat maintained
that coherence must be restored to the Constitution's basic fiscal provisions. He said:
I think the State has got to set up certain policies as to what sort of government
it is going to set up, how it is going to operate, and what basic financial prin-
ciples it is going to approve.
3 REvIsED RECoRD OF THE CONST. CONy. OF THE STATE OF N.Y. at 2267 (1938) [hereinafter
1938 CONVENTION].
Of course, coherence could be restored by eliminating the referendum requirement, but
that approach was not thought worthy of discussion. Instead, Moffat sought to give vital-
ity to the court-sanctioned independence of the authority by making it exclusively re-
sponsible for its own debts. Existing statutory disclaimers of state and local liability
were insufficient in view of Williamsburgh. Moffat noted:
Every single one of these authorities without exception provides in the statute
that the State shall not be liable, or a political subdivision shall not be liable
on the bonds of that authority. Yet, under the Williamsburgh Savings Bank case,
it is perfectly possible that the Legislature might authorize [payment on the
bonds].
1938 CONVENTION at 2262-63.
The floor opposition to the 'Moffat proposal was led by Robert Moses who strongly
argued that no constitutional restraints should be imposed on authorities. 1938 CONvEN-
TION at 2263-81. Williamsburgh, according to Moses, was "not a case in point." 1938
CONVENTION at 2278.
Delegate George R. Fearon agreed with Moffat that authorities must be brought within
the Constitution. Fearon observed:
The people of the State have consistently limited the power of the Legislature
with respect to the pledging of the credit of the State and yet under these
authorities up to date there has been a very serious question [that the Legislature
might authorize payment on the bonds].
1938 CONVENTION at 2274.
Fearon noted that the Moffat proposal would not prevent the use of authorities:
But it is proposed that there shall be certain restrictions, and it is proposed, at
least in here in this provision, which up to date Mr. Moses in quoting from his
political authority has very conveniently forgotten to mention, and when I
mention it, you will see immediately why the bond authorities are against this
proposal, and that is the proposal that neither the State nor any political sub-
division thereof shall at any time be liable for the payment of any obligations
issued by such public corporation hitherto or hereafter created, nor may the
Legislature accept or impose liability upon the State, or any political subdivision
in it ..... You know now why the bond attorneys are against it.
1938 CONVENTION at 2275.
Robert Moses requested Fearon to yield the floor, but Fearon declined. He continued:
This comes right down to the question of whether or not you are going to pro-
tect the credit of the State .... or whether you are going to give these authori-
ties an absolutely wide open hand . . . because they are relying on the proposi-
tion that if the revenues of the enterprise are not sufficient to meet the interest
and amortization, they can always .. - .. get the Legislature to say in effect
that the full faith and credit of the State is in back of it.
I believe that when people buy these bonds they should know definitely
and certainly that the credit of the State of New York and that the credit of
the municipality is not behind those bonds. There should not be any question
about it..... If they want to buy them under those circumstances, well and good,
but let us not have them buy those bonds and then come back to the Legislature
and say: "Well, there has been a precedent established in this State under the
Williamsburgh case. You did it in the Williamsburgh case, and have got to do it
for us. You have got to bail us out."
1938 CONVENTION at 2276.
The Convention adopted article X, § 5, shortly after the Fearon speech. 1938 CONVENTION
at 2282-91.
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$3.4 billion of voter approved full faith and credit debt. 8 At the same
date, the state had outstanding $5.6 billion of illegal debt.19 By the
use of immune statutes and the "no standing" rule the state has reached
the point where illegal debt exceeds legal debt by 65 percent.
I. ST. CLAIR
The St. Clair case involved, in the view of Court of Appeals Judge
Dye, "a patently unconstitutional gift of over $42,000,000 of the State's
money to a private corporation."20 The litigation arose from the passage
in 1956 of chapter 837 entitled, "An act to amend the pari-mutuel
revenue law, in relation to capital improvements to harness race
tracks."2' The act included legislative findings that the state's harness
18 N.Y. DEP'T or Aunrr AND CONTROL, COrmOLLER'S SrUDY ON DEBT-LIKE Comir-
mENTs OF TmE STATE OF NEW YoRx, 2 (1973).
19 Id. at 3. Indeed the debt of one authority, the Housing Finance Agency, exceeds
that of the state. Id. at 11. The $5.6 billion figure includes $2.7 billion of "moral obliga-
tion commitments; $2.4 billion of lease-purchase agreements; and $.5 billion of municipal
lease-purchase agreements supported by State aid. The illegal debt is largely the product
of the post-St. Clair period. As of December 31, 1962 there was outstanding only $24
million of lease-purchase obligations and $60 million of "moral obligation" debt. N.Y.
DEP'T oF Auorr AND CONTROL, COMOTRoLLER'S SPECiAL REPORT ON THE PuBLIc DEBT OF
TE STATE OF NEw YOR 1, 14 (February 1972).
Authorities are undoubtedly created to evade the constitutional limitations which
restrain government itself. However for the scheme to succeed the authority must be
given the indicia of an independent entity, separate from the state which created it.
Gaynor v. Marohn, 268 N.Y. 417, 198 N.E. 13 (1935) and Robertson v. Zimmerman, 268
N.Y. 52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935). But the grant of independence necessary to evade the
referendum requirement has severe political implications for the democracy. Although
performing normal governmental functions the policies and personnel of an authority
are not responsible to any elected official. Nor are its books and records subject to
public disclosure. N.Y. Post Corp. v. Moses, 10 N.Y. 2d 199, 176 N.E.2d 709, 219 N.Y.S.2d
7 (1961). The Comptroller has recently suggested that the statewide authorities may be
considered a "fourth branch of government." N.Y. DF 'T OF Auorr AND CONTROL, COMP-
TROLLER'S STUDY ON STATEWIDE PuBLIC AUTHOrmS: A FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNM[ENT?
(November 1972). The authority branch of government is distinguishable from the other
three since it is beyond the constitutional restraints which limit the old three. The
Comptroller reported, for authority fiscal years ended in 1971, that statewide authorities
held total assets of $13.3 billion, debt of $8.9 billion and gross revenues of $1.5 billion.
Id. at 6. The Comptroller noted:
jhese quasi-governmental agencies have been operating on a scale so massive
that, in some instances, they overshadow the fiscal operations of the State itself.
Audits of Statewide authorities by my staff have demonstrated that this form of
government operation is not inherently more efficient than the regular structure
of State government. Nor are they necessarily self-sustaining - as a group, they
have already received heavy assistance from the general taxpayer, and the com-
mitments they are making may result in substantial future calls on the tax dollar.
Id. at 1-2.
20 13 N.Y.2d at 81, 192 N.E.2d at 19, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 49. The constitution prohibits
the gift of state funds or credit to a private corporation. Article VII, § 8, provides:
The money of the state shall not be given or loaned to or in aid of any private
corporation or association, or private undertaking:
The succeeding clause similarly prohibits the gift or loan of state credit.
21 L. 1956 ch. 837. Governor Harriman, on signing the act noted:
The Attorney General advises that although the constitutionality of this bill has
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racing tracks had become "depreciated and inadequate" and thereby
deprived the state of revenues "which would accrue from increased
admissions and the deposit of larger sums in pari-mutuel pools." 22
The legislature further found that plant modernization would result
in increased attendance and larger state revenues.23 The tracks were,
of course, free to improve their plants but appeared unable or unwilling
to use their own funds for this purpose. Some approach to the state
treasury was therefore considered essential. Prior to the passage of
chapter 837 the state had taken as a tax eleven percent of the pari-
mutuel pool and half the breakage.24 Chapter 837 did not repeal
the existing tax provisions but provided for the tracks to share, on a
50-50 basis with the state, in any increased tax revenues over 1955
levels. 25 The track's share of these revenues was to be used to reimburse
the track for authorized capital improvements. 8 Reimbursement was
permitted only after completion of the capital improvement.27 The
act provided that the track's share was to be placed in a special account
in its own name followed by the words "construction account."2 Upon
completion of the capital improvements and cost certification by the
State Harness Racing Commission, the amounts in the special account
would be annually transferred to the track's general funds.29
The 1956 law had been improvidently drafted to provide that
the track would be entitled not only to cost reimbursement but to all
federal income taxes payable because of the inclusion of the reim-
been questioned, he does not believe "that there are serious objections to its
approval on grounds of constitutionality in its present form."
1956 McKINlEY's SESSION LAws at 1697.
22 L. 1956 ch. 837, § 1.
28 Id.
24 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWs § 8019 (McKinney Supp. 1972). Eleven percent was the top
rate, the tax being graduated according to the size of the pool.
25 L. 1956 ch. 837, § 5(a).
2 Id. § 10.
27 Id.
28Id. § 5(a). The act also provided that the funds in the special account were not
to be considered "public moneys." (§ 8). The Appellate Division summarized the act as
follows:
In essence, the 1956 law offers the tracks a formula under which the taxes
otherwise payable to the State will be reduced, provided they exceed the 1955
tax plateau and the tax savings are channeled into capital improvements.
Application of Blaikie, 11 App. Div. 2d 196, 204, 202 N.Y.S.2d 659, 668 (1st Dep't 1960).
29 L. 1956 ch. 837, §§ 6, 7, 10. In practice, the tracks would borrow to make the
improvements and then look to the special account for reimbursement in future years.
For example, if the track's share were three million annually and the cost of the improve-
ment were eighteen million, the track would recoup its cost six years after completion.
The act provided that interest on borrowing was not to be considered part of the track's
cost. (§ 10). Dispute as to another element of the track's "cost," (federal taxes), led to the
calling of a special session of the legislature and the major Court of Appeals case dis-
cussed in note 34 and pertinent text infra.
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bursement in the track's gross income. This provision added at least
fifty percent (the corporate tax rate) to the state's cost.30 The act took
no account of the fact that the track had acquired a valuable capital
improvement which would be depreciated and reduce federal taxes in
future years. The state had second thoughts about the arrangement and
in 1959 an Extraordinary Session of the legislature was called to amend
the Pari-Mutuel laws. The track capital improvement program was
eliminated.31 The legislature further provided that no track should
be reimbursed for any income taxes paid to the United States with
respect to any payments "heretofore or hereafter" made to a track
from a special account.32 Finally, and perhaps disingenuously, the legis-
lature recited that the foregoing was intended to "clarify" its 1956
intent.3 8
Roosevelt Raceway had completed its capital improvement pro-
gram in 1957 at a cost of $19,600,000. 34 Also in 1957 Roosevelt had
received $2,800,000 from its special account.8 5 Roosevelt notified the
Racing Commission that receipt of such sum had resulted in an ad-
ditional federal tax liability of $1,400,000 and requested that it be
credited with this amount for future payment.36 The Commission re-
fused stating its view that the track was not entitled to any reimburse-
ment for federal taxes. Roosevelt commenced an article 78 proceeding
to compel the Commission to correct its records.37 Roosevelt argued
that the 1956 law provided for the reimbursement of federal taxes. This
interpretation was accepted by all the courts involved in the litigation.
Roosevelt further argued that the 1959 law could not alter its rights
30 For example, if a reimbursement of 3 million were paid to the track, it would incur
a federal tax liability of 1.5 million which would also be reimbursable. On this point,
the 1956 act is not a model of clarity and was probably not intended to be. It provides:
[payment shall be made out of the special account] until such date as the
amounts paid to such harness race track from the construction account, less
income taxes paid thereon to the United States by such harness track, equals
the cost of the capital improvement.
Id. § 10.
31 L. 1959 ch. 881, § 7.
32 Id.
33 Id. § 10.
84 Roosevelt Raceway, Inc. v. Monaghan, 9 N.Y.2d 293, 302, 174 N.E.2d 71, 74, 213
N.Y.S.2d 729, 733 (1961).
35 Id.
36 Id. The subsequent litigation does not discuss where the state's commitment would
end under this approach, i.e., the addition reimbursement would result in further
federal taxes and so on.
37 Roosevelt Raceway, Inc. v. Monaghan, 17 Misc. 2d 1065, 187 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 9 App. Div. 2d 621, 191 N.Y.S.2d 362 (Ist Dep't 1959). This pro-
ceeding involved a motion to dismiss by the Racing Commissions on the grounds that
the action should have been brought against the State Tax Commission. The Racing
Commission's motion was denied.
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since it had completed its capital improvement program in 1957 pur-
suant to the provisions of the 1956 laws. The supreme court agreed
stating "[a] contract is created by action induced by or in reliance on
state legislation."38 The Appellate Division also agreed. 9 The Court of
Appeals in an opinion by Judge Fuld, reversed.40 Two dissenting judges,
Desmond and Burke, considered the 1959 law (eliminating federal tax
reimbursement), as interpreted by the majority, to constitute an impair-
38 Roosevelt Raceway, Inc. v. Monaghan, 22 Misc. 2d 776, 199 N.Y.S.2d 195, 202 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1960).
39 11 App. Div. 2d 206, 202 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1st Dep't 1960). The Appellate Division
decision was by 3-2 vote with Justices Stevens and Valente dissenting. At the Appellate
Division level the Attorney General substantially broadened his position to argue that
the 1956 law was unconstitutional in its entirety and hence could give rise to no rights.
The Attorney General argued that state funds were involved and that article VII, § 8, of
the constitution provides, "[t]he money of the state shall not be given or loaned to or
in aid of any private corporation." The majority of the Appellate Division dismissed this
argument on the grounds that no "money of the state" was involved, "[t]itle is always in
the track." Id. at 207, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 648. The court, therefore, accepted the statutory
disclaimer that moneys in the special account were not "public moneys." (§ 8). Dissenting
Justice Valente also focused on the title question but believed that the state had acquired
title when the funds were deposited "subject to divestiture" if certain conditions were
met. Justice Stevens, in dissent, thought the problems ran deeper and were not particu-
larly aided by an analysis of title. He noted that the 1956 law had been carefully tailored
to avoid constitutional principles, the "question is whether such avoidance was successful,
and the answer should be that it was not." Id. at 209, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 650. Justice Stevens
found the 1956 law to be violative of five separate constitutional provisions. The issue
of title had been purposely confused by the act's draftsman but Justice Stevens thought
it was certainly clear that the funds in question had been "collected by virtue of the tax-
ing power of the state." Id. at 210, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 652. The exercise of the power to tax
necessarily implies the duty to use the proceeds for a public purpose, Weismer v. Village
of Douglas, 64 N.Y. 91 (1876). In essence, the scheme of the 1956 law was that "prospective
tax revenues are pledged to supply capital improvements' for a private corporation. Id.
at 212, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 656. Justice Stevens noted that the track did not maintain that it
had a right "of control and absolute disposition" over the special account. If the funds
were public funds, as found by Justice Stevens, the 1956 law violated (1) article VII, § 8's
prohibition of the gift or loan of state property or credit to a private corporation; (2)
article III, § 22's requirement that every law imposing a tax shall distinctly state the
object to which it is to be applied; (3) article VII, § Ts requirement that state funds be
paid only by legislative appropriation; (4) article V, § l's requirement that state funds
be paid only after audit by the Comptroller; and (5) article XVI, § l's requirement that
the power of taxation can never be surrendered, suspended or contracted away. All these
provisions were sought to be avoided by the statutory disclaimer that the funds in the
special account were not "public moneys" and that the account be opened in the track's
"sown name." (§§ 5(a), 8). Justice Stevens found the disclaimer to be inaccurate.
The draftsman of the 1956 law had been presented with an insoluble problem. No
one would question the legal power of the legislature to reduce pari-mutuel taxes. But if
this were done the savings would be part of the general revenues of the tracks to do
with as they would. Understandably, it was not thought prudent to make the money
available to the tracks on a no-strings basis. On the other hand, no one would defend the
legality of - scheme whereby the state collected taxes and made grants to the tracks for
capital improvements or any other purpose. The draftsman sought to cure the problem
by expressly placing title to the money in the tracks while leaving control largely in the
state. Justice Stevens thought the effort a failure.
40 9 N.Y.2d 293, 174 N.E.2d 71, 213 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1961).
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ment of contract in violation of the federal constitution.41 The dissent-
ers noted, as was hardly arguable, that the state had induced large capi-
tal investment and that the law in effect when the investment was made
provided for reimbursement of costs and federal taxes. Whether the
investment was in reliance on the 1956 law was arguable. The majority
maintained that a student of the State Constitution would have placed
no reliance on the 1956 law since it was freely revocable. The notion of
an irrepealable law is difficult to justify under our governmental theory
and has been a source of trouble since Dartmouth College.42 Judge
Desmond observed:
If this 1956 statute and petitioner's action in reliance thereon
did not constitute an inviolable contract, it must be because the
courts are abolishing an ancient rule of constitutional law which
was founded on good morals and fair play and which has hereto-
fore forbade the State's breaching such contracts.48
Judge Burke agreed that the 1956 law "has all the elements of a con-
tract."44 He noted, "an offer was addressed to a specific party and a
41 The Federal Constitution provides that "[n]o state shall . . . . pass any . . . law
impairing the obligation of contracts." U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 10.
42 The Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 US. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
The state constitution contains two express prohibitions of irrepealable laws: (1) article X,
§ 1 (added in 1846) provides that all laws relating to the formation of private or public
corporations "may be altered from time to time or repealed"; (2) article XVI, § I (added
in 1938) provides that all tax exemptions "may be altered or repealed" with certain ex-
ceptions not pertinent here.
In the absence of express constitutional prohibition there is substantial doubt as
to the power of a legislature to bind the future even by express contract. Chief Justice
Doe of the New Hampshire Supreme Court wrote that the state constitution vested
the legislative power in the Senate and House of Representatives. Doe, A New View of
the Dartmouth College Case, 6 HARv. L. Rv. 161, 213 (1892). See N.Y. CONsT. art. III,
§ 1. The Chief Justice took the view that the Legislature had no power to contract
away its delegated powers. He noted:
No one contends that the Senate and House can change the Constitution; no
one denies that their valid contract, divesting them of the entire law-making
power which the Constitution vests in them, would be an amendment of the
Constitution; and they can no more amend it by destroying a part of that
power than by destroying the whole of it.
6 HARv. L. Rv. at 214.
The Chief Justice continued:
On the second day of June, 1784, when the Constitution began to be in
force, they [the New Hampshire legislature] had the whole legislative power,
including the power of repeal; and from that day to this, by the true construc-
tion, they have been legally incapable of diminishing that power by contract
or otherwise.
Id. at 215.
489 N.Y.2d at 319, 174 N.E.2d at 84, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 748. Judge Desmond believed
that the legislative intent to create a contract was clear from another provision of the
1956 law. Prior to 1956, the Racing Commission was authorized to license operation
of a harness track for no more than one year period. As part of the 1956 changes, the
law was amended to permit licenses for terms up to 25 years, but not to exceed the time
"necessary to amortize any loan for capital improvements." (§ 2).
44 Id. at 325, 174 N.E.2d at 87, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
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promise made to that party that, if it was approved by the State and if
it completed improvements which had to receive a State certification, it
would be reimbursed." 45 Judge Burke continued:
The principle -that subsequent legislation cannot take away
rights promised by prior legislation, especially after the promisee
has acted in reliance upon the promise - protects respondent.
Legislation by the State which violates section 10 of Article I
of the United States Constitution is violative of the due process
clause of section 6 of Article I of the State Constitution.46
Judges Burke and Desmond's belief that the 1959 law impaired a con-
tract in violation of the Federal Constitution was not accepted by the
Supreme Court which subsequently dismissed an appeal "for want of
substantial federal question."47
Judge Fuld, for the majority, agreed that the 1956 law clearly
provided for the track to be reimbursed for federal taxes.48 The 1959
law, however, dearly provided that they would not be so reimbursed.
Was there any reason to hold the later law ineffective? The court
thought not.
Judge Fuld approached the question by seeking to determine the
precise nature of the contract which was said to be impaired. He ex-
pressed uncertainty as to what Roosevelt claimed the terms of its as-
serted contract with the state to be.49 Clearly, Roosevelt did not main-
tain that the contract contained a promise by the State to use state
funds to construct the tracks. This was "manifestly necessary to over-
come the impact of constitutional prohibitions,"5 0 since, if so inter-
preted, the contract would be totally illegal and Roosevelt would be
entitled to no reimbursement. If the funds were public funds the act
violated article VII, § 8 (gift and loan prohibition); article VII, § 7
(appropriation requirement); and article V, § 1 (comptroller audit
requirement). Certainly, the contract did not provide for the use of
track funds to construct the track since no contract was necessary for
that. The only other possible interpretation of the contract was that it
constituted a "contract for tax relief - a promise by the state to keep
the reduction enacted in the 1956 tax formula intact and unchanged
45 Id.
46 Id. at 329, 174 N.E.2d at 90, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 756.
47 368 U.S. 12 (1961).
48 judge Fuld expressly reserved the question of the constitutionality of the 1956
law since he concluded that Roosevelt's petition must be dismissed in any event. Two
years later in St. Clair, the Court, over Judge Fuld's dissent, determined that the reserved
question would never be answered.
49 9 N.Y.2d at 306, 174 NY.2d at 76, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
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until the track has been made whole.... ." Construed in this manner,
the contract could not be binding upon the state because the state's
undertaking - to keep a tax exemption in effect - was in violation of
the state constitution. Judge Fuld commented, "[s]uch contract, if not
indeed void in its inception - and this is a question as to which we ex-
press no opinion - is at all times revocable by the State."'5 2 The con-
tract was "at all times revocable" because the constitution provides that
tax "[e]xemptions may be altered or repealed. "53 Judge Fuld continued:
Just as the "reserved power" to amend corporate charters,
found in section 1 of article X of our Constitution, "prevents
the charter from becoming a contract between state and corpora-
don protected from impairment by the [federal] Constitution"
(citation omitted), so section 1 of article XVI of our Constitution
"prevents" the 1956 legislative promise to reduce the harness
track's taxes "from becoming a contract between state and cor-
poration protected from impairment by the [Federal] Constitu-
tion." (citations omitted). In other words, in view of the first
sentence of section 1 of article XVI the State may not be said to
have breached any contract or agreement with Roosevelt to main-
tain its State tax at the level provided for in 1956 for the reason
that no one was empowered to enter into such an agreement on
behalf of the State.54
1 Id. at 307, 174 N.E.2d at 76, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
621d. Judge Fuld quoted from article XVI, § 1 of the constitution which provides
in relevant part:
The power of taxation shall never be surrendered, suspended or contracted away,
except as to securities issued for public purposes pursuant to law....
Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by general laws. Exemptions
may be altered or repealed except those exempting real or personal property
used exclusively for religious, educational or charitable purposes .. "
The question reserved by Judge Fuld - whether such a contract was void in its inception
- is difficult. Clearly exemptions can be granted only by general law. For example,
The Housing Finance Agency statute enacted in 1960, states that the "property of the
agency and its income and operations shall be exempt from taxation." N.Y. PRsv. Hous.
FIN. LAw 53. The Housing Finance Agency was created by special act (see N.Y. CONSr. art.
X, § 5) and the quoted provision is consequently void in its inception. The 1956 harness
track law, however, seems to be a general law.
53 This language was added to the constitution in 1938. It was drafted by Mr. Martin
Saxe of New York who was Chairman of the Committee on Taxation at both the 1915
and 1938 Conventions. In 1915 Saxe's effort to insert similar language into the Con-
stitution was defeated by the convention after objection by General Wickersham who
doubted the wisdom of a "clause which would attempt to repeal contracts, solemnly
made by the State." 1915 REcoRD at 957.
549 N.Y.2d at 307, 174 N.E.2d at 76, 77, 213 N.Y.S.2d 737. Judge Fuld's reference
to the reserved power of article X, § 1 will be noted. That section, added in 1846 to
overrule Dartmouth College, provided that all laws relating to the formation of private
or public corporations "may be altered from time to time or repealed." The statute
creating the Housing Finance Agency, a public corporation, is such a law. N.Y. Parn. Hous.
FIN. LAws § 43 (McKinney Supp. 1972). Because of the constitutionally reserved power
all provisions of this statute are freely revocable. Yet this statute contains a section
entitled "Agreement with the State" which provides:
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Judge Dye expressed "complete agreement" with Judge Fuld but, with
foresight, desired to go further and treat the constitutionality of the
1956 law as a whole.55 Judge Dye found the 1956 act void in its en-
tirety. 6
The state does hereby pledge to and agree with the holders of any notes or
bonds issued under this article, that the state will not limit or alter the rights
hereby vested in the agency to fulfill the terms of any agreements made with the
holders thereof or in any way impair the rights and remedies of such holders
until such notes or bonds ... are fully met and discharged.
Id. § 48 (McKinney 1962).
While the draftsman of the 1960 statute did not have the benefit of Judge Fuld's opinion,
the language of article X, § 1, is perfectly dear. In Judge Fuld's language, "no one was
empowered to enter into such an agreement on behalf of the State." A constitutional
amendment would have been required. An intent to mislead prospective bond purchasers
should not be imputed to the legislature. Also, the bondholders were capable of pro-
tecting their own interests. Nonetheless, the Housing Finance Agency statute was "void
in its inception" and the bondholders hold illegal debt.
559 N.Y.2d at 311, 174 N.E.2d at 79, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
58Judge Dye thought the issue should be met because the "problem is basic,
involving as it does the reach of constitutional safeguards surrounding the use of
public funds." Id. He had no doubt that the funds in question, raised by the taxing
power, were public. Consequently, he found the 1956 law violative of five constiti-
tional provisions: (1) article VII, § 8 (gift or loan of money or credit prohibition);
(2) article XVI, § 1 (prohibition against contracting away of taxing power); (3) article
III, § 22 (requirement for a law imposing a tax); (4) article VII, § 7 (appropriations
requirement; and (5) article V, § 1 (Comptroller audit requirement).
The statutory disclaimer that the funds in the special account shall be held "not as
public moneys" (§ 8) did not impress Judge Dye: "This characterization neither inhibits
nor prevents the court from reaching a contrary conclusion . . . such labels . . .. may
not serve as a substitute for legislative power, which finds its source in the Constitution.
If it were otherwise, the State would soon be divested of all its funds simply by labeling
them as 'private.'" 9 N.Y.2d at 314, 174 NE.2d at 81, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
A similar statutory disclaimer is found in the Housing Finance Agency statute. L.
1960 ch. 671. That act provides that the state "shall not be liable" on the bonds of
the agency and such bonds "shall not be a debt of the state." N.Y. Psuv. Hous. FIN. LAw
§ 46(8) (McKinney 1962). Disclaimers seem to appear when a draftsman is trying to shore
up a structure which is not basically sound. The harness track law raised moaey by
taxes and gave the state substantial control over its disposition. To attempt to prevent
the obvious conclusion that public funds are involved, the draftsman inserted express
language stating that the funds are held "not as public moneys." The Housing Finance
Agency is a parallel situation. The disclaimer states that HFA Bonds "shall not be a
debt of the state." But the HFA statute elsewhere provides that the state shall guarantee
payment of the HFA bonds. Id. § 47(l)(d). It provides that if the HFA reserve for the
payment of principal and interest is insufficient that the HFA shall state the needed
amount to the Governor "and the amount so stated, if any, shall be apportioned and
paid to the agency during the current state fiscal year." Consequently, the state guarantees
the reserve fund out of which the bonds are payable. It will be noted that the state is
given no discretion with respect to this payment; the statute uses the mandatory, "shall."
The state therefore becomes liable on the HFA bonds if default appears imminent. This
relationship would normally be described as a guarantee or contingent liability. The
Comptroller believes the statute to create "contingent debt" on the part of the state.
1971 ANN. REP. OF COMPTROLLER 18. But, the state, under New York's constitution cannot
incur any debt, contingent or direct, without a referendum of the people. The consti-
tution provides that "no debt shall be hereafter contracted by or in behalf of the
state" except by a vote of the people. N.Y. CoNsr. art. VII, § 11. The referendum
requirement for state debt was added to the Constitution in 1846 following a constitu-
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Roosevelt's appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed in October
of 1961 for want of a substantial federal question.57 The Supreme
Court's action ended any lingering doubts on the impairment of con-
tract issue. Roosevelt had fully performed under one set of rules. The
state found the bargain disadvantageous and changed the rules. The
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court held that Roosevelt had no
remedy.
The Roosevelt decision was one of the most significant in the his-
tory of the Court of Appeals. The court's hostility toward vested rights,
impairment of contract theories and irrepealable laws was evident. All
efforts to bind the future were rejected. No statute premised on such
principles could reasonably expect to survive review by the court. Such
a statute could only survive if the court's power of review were elim-
inated. The court itself performed this task in St. Clair. The pardoned
statute in question is the Housing Finance Agency Act of 1960. The
outstanding debt of this agency presently exceeds that of New York
State.58
This act makes a number of state and local commitments which are
void in their inception including (1) the state guarantee of HFA
bonds;59 (2) the exemptions of HFA property and income from state
and local taxes; 60 and (3) the tax exemption of interest on HFA bonds.61
The act asserts its irrepealability by providing that the "state does
hereby pledge to and agree with the holders" of bonds that it will not
"in any way impair the rights and remedies" of any bondholders until
the bonds are discharged.62 The HFA act is constitutionally extrava-
gant; what is void in its inception is said to be irrepealable.
tional convention. Michael Hoffman, chairman of the Convention's Finance Committee
explained its necessity:
It was saying that we will not trust the legislature with the power of creating
indefinite mortgages on the people's property and.., that whenever the people
were to have their property mortgaged for a State debt, that it should be done
by their own voice and their own consent.
1846 DEBATES at 946.
A disclaimer that debt is not debt cannot, in Judge Dye's words "serve as a substitute
for legislative power, which finds its source in the Constitution." 9 N.Y.2d at 314, 174
N.E2d at 81, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 743. The legislature had no power to undeftake the guar-
antee found in the Housing Finance Agency statute.
57368 U.S. 12 (1961).
58 N.Y. DEP'T OF Aumrr AND CONTROL, CoMPtRoLLER's STUDY ON DEBT-I.KE COM-
MiTMENT OF THE STATE OF N.Y. 11 (1973). The HFA's outstanding debt as of June 30,
1972 was $3.812 million while that of the State of New York was $3.378 million. Id. at 3.
59 N.Y. PRay. Hous. FIN. LAws § 47(1)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
6od. § 53 (McKinney 1962).
61Id. § 54. This provision is clearly void since it purports to be irrepealable,
providing that the interest "shall at all times be free from taxation."
62Id. § 48.
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In view of the questions expressly reserved by Judge Fuld in
Roosevelt Raceway, some follow-up litigation was inevitable. Edward
St. Clair, as a citizen and taxpayer, brought an action to prevent the
alleged misapplication of $42,000,000 and for a judgment declaring
§ 45-a to be unconstitutional. St. Clair asserted that the provision
violated article VII, § 8 of the constitution which prohibits the gift or
loan of state money or credit in aid of "any private undertaking." The
lower courts dismissed the complaint.63 The Court of Appeals affirmed
in a brief opinion.6 4 Judge Burke, for the four man majority,65 noted
that we "have always held that the constitutionality of a State statute
may be tested only by one personally aggrieved."'66 He continued:
"Thus we have found anew that the rationale propounded in [Doolittle
and Komfort] remains sound today." 67 The remainder of the opinion
consists of quotations from Judge Chase in Schieffelin v. Komfort68 and
Justice Black in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.69 Both quotations em-
phasize that the St. Clair court propounded a constitutional principle
i.e., that citizen standing violates the separation of powers.70 The quota-
tion from Justice Black recites that the standing issue,
does not rest upon a mere formality. We rest it upon reasons
deeply rooted in the constitutional divisions of authority in our
system of Government7 l
Judge Fuld's dissent focused on the central issue, the enforcement of
the Constitution. The denial of citizen standing "will in most instances
prevent any challenge." He observed:
63 The St. Clair majority, by Judge Burke, states that the complaint was dismissed
"on the grounds that appellant lacks legal capacity to sue." 13 N.Y.2d at 15, 192 N.E.
at 15, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 44. The lower court opinions, however, are not reported.
64 The Court of Appeals' opinion comprises only seven paragraphs, much of them
made up of quotes from other cases. The divestiture of the court's constitutional review
power was performed in a summary manner.
65 The four man majority consisted of Judges Burke, Desmond, Foster and Scileppi.
The dissenters were Judges Fuld, Dye, and Van Voorhis. (These three, together with
Judge Foster had formed the majority in Roosevelt Raceway; Judges Burke and Des-
mond had dissented along with Judge Froessel). Over the next 10 years the composition
of the court was to change but the 4-3 split on citizen standing remained.
66 13 N.Y.2d at 76, 192 N.E.2d at 15, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
67 Id.
68212 N.Y. 520, 107 N.E. 675 (1914).
69 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
70 The language quoted from Komfort includes the following: -
The assumption of jurisdiction in any other case [than a personally aggrieved
suit] would be an interference by one department of government with another
department of government when each is equally independent with the powers
conferred upon it by the Constitution itself.
13 N.Y.2d at 76, 192 N.E.2d at 16, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
71.1d. at 77, 192 N.E.2d at 16, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
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It hardly seems consonant with the Constitution itself that
the enforcement of its provisions should have to turn on the
meaning ascribed to it by members of the executive or adminis-
trative branch of government or on whether they choose to assert
themselves.
It is self-evident that the denial of standing to a taxpayer will
in most instances prevent any challenge to an expenditure of
state funds as violative of the Constitution.7 2
Judge Fuld thought the "suggestions" of the majority opinion that the
Attorney General may be relied upon to attack the validity of state laws
"both unreal in fact and dubious in theory."7 Nor was Judge Fuld im-
pressed by the majority's main premise, that citizen standing would be
an "interference" by one department of government with another. He
noted, "[fjundamental to our form of government is the principle that
determination of the constitutionality of legislation is essentially a judi-
cial function."7 4
Judge Dye, in a separate dissent, stated that no court-made rule
should "be interposed to give a benediction to a patently unconstitu-
tional gift of over $42,000,000 of the State's money to a private corpora-
tion. ' 75 Judge Dye further expressed his total disagreement with the
"personally aggrieved" standard. He observed:
The personal monetary interest should not be the test, but
whether, in fact, the Constitution of the State of New York is
being flouted.76
The predictions of the dissenters were accurate - the state entered
a ten year period during which the executive customarily disregarded
the constitution.
72 Id. at 79, 192 N.E2d at 18, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 47. Judge Fuld continued:
Certainly, our Constitution does not entrust the determination of constitu-
tionality to the executive branch of government ....
The Constitution is a People's document and the hypothesis that a citizen-
taxpayer has no "interest" in state expenditures is little more than a legal
fiction.
Id.
73 Id. Judge Fuld believed it more appropriate for the Attorney General to defend
challenged statutes rather "than initiate an attack of its own." The instant litigation
was a case in point since the Attorney General appeared pro se allying himself with
Yonkers in defense of the statute.
74 Id. In concluding his dissent Judge Fuld moved to a broader ground observing:
The apathy of the average citizen concerning public affairs has often been
decried; under the court-made rule now reaffirmed, it is being compelled.
13 N.Y.2d at 81, 192 N.E.2d at 19, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 48. St. Clair removed the "People's
document" from the hands of the people. The executive would henceforth determine the
legality of its acts.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 82, 192 N.E.2d at 19, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
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II. AuTHoRITY CONSIDERED BY ST. CLAIR
St. Clair-in its assertion that "[w]e have always held that the
constitutionality of a State statute may be tested only by one personally
aggrieved" - relied on only three cases, Doolittle v. Supervisors of
Broome County;77 Schieffelin v. Komfort;78 and Bull v. Stichman.79 The
court considered Judge Denio's 1858 decision in Doolittle as the foun-
tainhead of the "no standing" rule in New York. As will be seen this
belief arises more from certain broad language in the opinion rather
than the actual holding.
In Doolittle it appears that the town of Chenango was, by act of
the County Board of Supervisors, to be divided into three new towns.80
Seventeen residents of an alleged new town, Port Crane, brought this
action to obtain a judgment declaring the act of the board of super-
visors null and void."' The proceeding, consequently, appeared to be
one for declaratory judgment rather than mandamus.8 2 The substantive
ground for the plaintiffs' complaint is not stated. Judge Denio, for
purposes of his decision, assumed the County Board's action to be void.
Plaintiffs' "grievance is that they are threatened to be subjected for the
purposes of local administration to a jurisdiction not created according
to law."88 Judge Denio thought this a wrong not only to the plaintiffs,
freeholders of Port Crane, but to (1) all inhabitants of Port Crane; (2)
all inhabitants of the other two supposed towns; (3) all the people of
Broome County; and (4) all the people of the state. The wrong affected
these classes with varying intensity depending on their distance from
the center of the wrong, the illegal town. The freeholders of Port Crane
and the other alleged towns were threatened with the most drastic harm
since they were subject to taxation and imprisonment by the illegal
officials. All residents of the towns, however, were "liable, in a variety
of ways, to the action of the local magistracy."8' 4 The liberties of the
town residents were most directly endangered by the threat of illegal
taxation and imprisonment. But all the people of Broome County were
7718 N.Y. 155 (1858).
78212 N.Y. 520, 106 N.E. 675 (1914).
79298 N.Y. 516, 80 NXE.2d 661 (1948). The Court of Appeals wrote no opinion in
the Bull case. The appellate division is found at 273 App. Div. 311, '78 N.Y.S.2d 279
(3d Dep't 1948).
80 The facts are not fully stated in Doolittle.
81 18 N.Y. at 155 (headnote).
82This may explain the fact that the Collins case, decided in 1837, is not cited
in the opinion.
83 18 N.Y. at 157.
84 Id.
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harmed for in the "administration of justice and the management of
the fiscal affairs of the county, the magistrates to be chosen in the new
towns will be often called upon to perform duties" which will affect
every town in the county s5 Moreover, to "a still slighter degree, but to
an extent which may be appreciated, the substitution of pretended legal
authority - for the rightful magistracy, works an injury to all the
people."80 The state's public business requires the "co-operation of legal
magistrates of every grade." An illegal change of the "local districts into
which the State, for the purposes of administration, is divided and sub-
divided, would naturally be productive of extensive inconveniences and
losses to individuals as well as to the state in its corporate character. 817
The threatened harm, under Judge Denio's analysis, seemed grave
enough. But was the plaintiff's action, however, premature? Judge
Denio wrote:
The officers constituted under the new arrangement would have
no rightful authority, and when the act should result in directly
touching the property or the person of an individual citizen, his
remedy for the wrong would be perfect in the ordinary course of
justice. Hence, if the plaintiffs in this case are correct in their
principal position; and they, or any of them shall be directly
disturbed in their personal rights or pecuniary interest by any one
acting under the resolutions of the board of supervisors, they have
only to appeal to the courts for redress against the wrong-doer
in the ordinary way. Up to this time no private interest of the
plaintiffs has been invaded, and no injury peculiar to them is
threatened. It is said that they may be assessed to pay taxes ...
[b]ut, no valid tax can be imposed through its agency, and the
plaintiffs are under no necessity to institute a suit on that ac-
count.88
To this point Judge Denio's opinion hardly supports a "no standing"
rule since he only requires a concrete wrong to perfect plaintiff's
rights."9 The threat of an illegal tax was not sufficient. Any effort to en-
force an illegal tax, however, would clearly necessitate judicial review.
Under St. Clair, of course, a citizen-taxpayer has no right to question
the enforcement of an illegal tax. The forcible exaction of a tax pro-
vides no opportunity to argue that the taxing statute has been enacted
in disregard of the constitution."
85Id. at 158.
so Id.
87 Id.
sold. at 158-59.
89 Presumably, the plaintiffs argued that the question was ripe since concrete harm
would undoubtedly flow from the creation of the illegal town.
90 Conceivably, if a taxpayer is imprisoned in connection with tax collection pro-
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The remainder of Judge Denio's opinion is devoted to the stand-
ing question with respect to the "actual wrong" done to plaintiffs, i.e.,
the creation of a town not according to law.91 Judge Denio viewed this
as a public wrong and the "general rule certainly is that for wrongs
against the public, whether actually committed or only apprehended,
the remedy, whether civil or criminal is by a prosecution instituted by
the State." 92 Judge Denio noted the analogy of criminal prosecution,
"criminal offenses of every grade, as is well known, are punishable only
by prosecution at the suit of the people."9 3 Of course, where a crime
"includes a private injury, the latter may, it is true, be prosecuted at
the suit of the party injured but where there is no direct individual
injury no action can be maintained." 94 The action cannot be main-
tained despite the fact that "every citizen has an interest in the main-
tenance of order and the prevention of crime."95 Judge Denio's
reference to "direct individual injury" is similar to his earlier phrases,
"directly touching the property or person," "directly disturbed in their
personal rights or pecuniary interest" and "actual wrong." This lan-
guage indicates that Judge Denio's standing test was based on direct or
personal injury in fact. Public wrong, of the sort incurred by a New
York City resident when an upstate town is illegally created, should not
give rise to litigation. The outcome of the litigation will more directly
affect the residents of the illegal town and they are more appropriate
parties to control the litigation. The direct injury-in-fact test assures
that the action will be maintained by an appropriate party. There is no
question that an appropriate party will appear since the new town is
certain to assess taxes and asserts its jurisdiction in many ways. St. Clair
is based on contrary reasoning since it disregards a taxpayer's injury in
fact. Further, St. Clair is contrary since it adopts a test which assures
that no party will be an appropriate party.
Judge Denio moves to broader language, more agreeable to St.
Clair, in his discussion of the doctrine of public nuisance and its special
injury notions. He observed:
Common or public nuisances, which are such as are inconvenient
or injurious to the whole community in general are, as all are
aware, indictable only, and not actionable; for as Blackstone says,
"it would be unreasonable to multiply suits by giving every man a
ceedings his status would rise from that of a mere taxpayer to that of one "personally
aggrieved." St. Clair does not discuss the point.
91 18 N.Y. at 159.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
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separate right of action for what damnifies him in common only
with the rest of his fellow citizens" ... Where the act complained
of, or which is apprehended, besides being a public nuisance, is
specially injurious to a private person, he may maintain an action
or a bill for an injunction in his own name.96
A plant which spews smoke and soot into the air injures everyone in the
area. Injury in fact exists. But the public nuisance doctrine held that a
plaintiff could not maintain an action unless he could prove special or
additional injury. For example, a drapery shop might be able to main-
tain an action while an adjoining law office could not. Judge Denio
noted that the determination of whether a special injury existed was
"sometimes difficult" 97 but that no problem existed in the present case
because the "act of the supervisors has no bearing upon the plaintiff's
individual interests." 98
In discussing the policy aspects of the question Judge Denio
moves even closer to St. Clair and seems to adopt a "no taxpayer stand-
ing" rule. This appears inconsistent with other aspects of the opinion
and no reconciliation is attempted. In any case, Judge Denio noted that
permissive standing would be "productive of very great inconve-
niences."9 9 The feared "inconveniences" included (1) suits against "the
acts of any administrative board or officer in the State, and thus pro-
ceedings, which are intended to be summary and inexpensive, can only
be perfected by" court action; (2) "the courts may regularly be called
upon to revise all laws which may be passed"; (3) the courts may "be
96 Id. at 160.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 161-62. It is not clear that Judge Denio was equating the "special injury"
of the public nuisance cases with "individual interest" as he used the term. He returned
to his theme of prematurity:
If it [the question] be one of jurisdiction, a party who, in common with his
fellow-citizens, is menanced by it, must, in respect to his legal remedy, wait until
his individual rights are invaded. If the grievance consists in an alleged illegal
exercise of official functions, those who question them, if they would have a
preventive remedy, must invoke the action of the officers whom the law has
appointed to sue in such cases.
Id. at 163 (emphasis supplied). Denio's view that the plaintiff must "wait until his
individual rights are invaded" fairly implies that the wait will not be infinite. The infi-
nite wait is undoubtly the most depressing aspect of the St. Clair "personally aggrieved"
approach. The Court of Appeals, in St. Clair, was clear that no personally aggrieved
person would ever appear to test the statute in question. The point was made by Judge
Fuld in his dissent and not disputed by the majority. The full import of St. Clair has
not, however, always been clear to the lower courts. For example, in 1972, a Supreme
Court opinion viewed St. Clair as holding:
Prior decisions of our highest court require that we must wait until the issue
of constitutional validity has ripened into a form where concrete adversary posi-
tions illuminate the necessarily difficult determination.
Beaux Arts Prop. Inc. v. United Nations Dev. Corp. 68 Misc. 2d 785, 790, 328 N.Y.S.2d
16, 21-22 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972) (citation omitted).
99 18 N.Y. at 162.
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required to enjoin the comptroller from drawing warrants on the
treasurer"; and (4) the "State and county officers might be compelled to
litigate the question of constitutionality with any taxpayer who should
see fit to question a State or local tax in any and every case, and thus the
fiscal business of the State would come to be transacted mainly in the
courts." 100
Judge Denio's opinion is puzzling and ambiguous. It is fairly clear
that he was not focusing on the St. Clair situation with its necessary
conclusion that the most blatant unconstitutional acts are to be per-
mitted. Further, it seems exaggerated to read the case as establishing a
strict "no citizen-taxpayer standing" rule in New York. Certainly, the
Court of Appeals, only nine years later, did not so view it. In the Halsey
case the Court permitted a citizen and taxpayer to mandamus the
Treasurer of Steuben county.10 1 The Court noted that this "in no way
conflicts with the decisions of this court" in Doolittle.-0 2 The distinc-
tion, between Doolittle and a case where an "individual acts as relator
or representative of the people to redress a public wrong by man-
damus," was, in Judge Fullerton's words, "strikingly apparent."'03 If
Doolittle did intend to establish a strict "no taxpayer standing" rule it
was quickly modified and limited by the Halsey decision. Halsey was
not cited in the St. Clair opinion.
The second case relied on by the Court in St. Clair for its proposi-
tion that "[w]e have always held" against citizen standing in Schieffelin
v. Komfort. 04 The St. Clair Court quoted with approval the following
language of Judge Chase in Komafort:
100 Id. at 162-63. Judge Denio concluded his opinion by discussing a group of
earlier cases, distinguishing some and not following others. Even here the opinion is
difficult to follow. In an English case, Bromley v. Smith, 57 Eng. Rep. 482, 1 Sim.
8 (ch. 1826), parliament had passed a private act permitting certain commoners to
inclose the commons and associate and make rules and regulations for its cultivation
and management. In addition, the act authorized appointment of a treasurer. Nine
parishioners, on behalf of themselves and the other commoners, brought an action against
the treasurer alleging misappropriation of funds and demanding an accounting. The
suit was permitted and plaintiff's counsel in Doolittle apparently viewed the case as
supporting taxpayer standing. Judge Denio, however, disagreed, noting, "[n]ow, the
right of common is as strictly a private right as any other interest in land. It is an
incorporeal hereditament, and it is not less a private and individual interest in real
estate where lands subject to rights of common are allowed to be inclosed under
private acts of parliament." 18 N.Y. at 167. But if the right of common is a "private"
and "individual interest" permitting standing, why is not the title to a taxpayer's property
given equal status?
101 37 N.Y. 344 (1867).
102 Id. at 347.
1l Id. at 348.
104 212 N.Y. 520, 106 N.E. 675 (1914). Lower court decisions are found at 163 App.
Div. 741, 149 N.Y.S. 65 (1st Dep't 1914) and 86 Misc. 678, 149 N.Y.S. 254 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1914).
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Jurisdiction has never been directly conferred upon the courts
to supervise the acts of other departments of government. The
jurisdiction to declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional
arises because it is the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment of government to declare the law in the determination of
the individual rights of the parties.
The assumption of jurisdiction in any other case would be
an interference by one department of government with another
department of government when each is equally independent
within the powers conferred upon it by the constitution itself. 05
On April 7, 1914, a special election was held on the question,
"Shall there be a convention to revise the Constitution and amend the
same?"'' 00 The constitution provided for a constitutional convention if
"a majority of the electors voting thereon shall decide in favor of a
convention."'1 7 The canvass of votes showed that the people favored
a convention by the narrow margin of 1,253 votes. 08 The canvass
reported, out of 310,444 votes cast, 153,222 in favor and 152,969 op-
posed. 09 The remaining 5,253 votes were either blank or void. Con-
sequently, the meaning of a majority "voting thereon" as used in the
Constitution became critical. If a majority of the votes cast, 310,444,
was required the call for a convention was defeated." 0 If a majority of
"effective" votes was sufficient it was adopted. A further problem was
election fraud, what Justice Samuel Seabury called the "shocking situa-
tion revealed by the evidence" in fourteen election districts.' 1 The
frauds in these districts were, according to Judge Seabury, "so wide-
spread as to utterly destroy the probative value of the returns made.""12
Moreover, two additional legal questions of some substance were in-
volved. First, the Constitution of 1894 granted suffrage to every man of
twenty-one who had resided in the state for one year."83 In order to
assure that the right of suffrage might be exercised, the constitution
required, prior to any "election," that laws be enacted providing for
"the registration of voters."" 4 It appeared that no registration of voters
had taken place prior to the vote on the convention call. The failure to
register was defended on the grounds that it was not an "election." 15 If
105 212 N.Y. at 530, 106 N.E. at 677.
100 The spedal election was held pursuant to L. 1913, ch. 819.
107 N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 2 (1894).
108 86 Misc. at 681, 149 N.Y.S. at 256.
l9 Id.
110 163 App. Div. 742-43, 149 N.Y.S. at 65-66.
Ill 86 Misc. at 691, 149 N.Y.S. at 262.
112 Id.
118 N.Y. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1894).
114 Id. at § 4.
115 163 App. Div. at 743, 149 N.Y.S. at 66.
[Vol. 47:429
STANDING TO SUE
the vote on the convention call was an "election" the constitution had
not been complied with and the call was void. The second legal ques-
tion was more technical and involved the same constitutional provision.
In order to permit investigation of the right of voters to register the
constitution required that registration be completed at least ten days
prior to the election.116 Plaintiff claimed that 10 days had not elapsed. 117
Plaintiff brought an action to enjoin the boards of election and
state election officials from taking steps preliminary to the nomination
and election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention.118 This step,
of course, could only be taken if the convention call had received a
favorable vote. Justice Seabury, at Special Term, denied the motion
for an injunction pendente lite noting that the questions raised were
of the "gravest character."" 9 While the questions were grave the time
pressure was harsh. The motion papers were finally submitted to Sea-
bury on August 20 and his opinion is dated August 24.120 He hoped
that his "speedy decision" would provide ample time for review by the
appellate courts before the question became moot.' 12 The Attorney
General put forward several arguments which Judge Seabury felt could
not be ignored since, "I am unwilling, even impliedly, to give assent."'122
These included (1) the doctrine that the returns of election inspectors,
even if fraudulent, are final; (2) the doctrine that equity will not take
jurisdiction of election contests; 23 and (3) that a citizen taxpayer has
no standing. Judge Seabury commented on the "no standing" argument
as follows:
116 N.Y. CONsr. art 11, § 4 (1894). This seems to be an alternative argument to
the failure to register point. In fact, it appears that the failure to register issue was
not raised until the case reached the appellate division.
117 The issue depended on how you counted; if ten days was taken to mean 240
hours the constitution was not complied with since registration ended at 10:00 P.M.,
March 28 and the election commenced at sunrise on April 7, about 224 hours. Or the
constitution was also violated if read to require 10 days after completion of registration
and before election day. This seems a normal reading of the provision but March 29-
April 6 is only nine days. Justice Seabury rejected plaintiffs argument maintaining
that the date of election should be counted making ten days. 86 Misc. at 690, 149 N.Y.S.
at 261. The plaintiffs argument, while technical, was not insubstantial. The constitution,
for a legitimate purpose, requires a ten day elapsed period; it is not difficult to comply
with and peculiar counting methods should not be resorted to.
118 It is not clear why plaintiff's counsel sought an injunction rather than a
mandamus. There seems no practical diffierence and the mandamus had a highly success-
ful history in the Court of Appeals. The severe time pressures of Komfort may be
the explanation.
119 86 Misc. at 681, 149 N.Y.S. at 256.
120 149 N.Y.S. at 254. This language does not appear in the official report.
12186 Misc. at 682, 149 N.Y.S. at 256. In fact, the Court of Appeals decided the case
on October 23, a few days before the scheduled election of delegates.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 684, 149 N.Y.S. at 258. Judge Seabury stated:
The cases which hold that equity will not assume jurisdiction in election con-
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Doubtless such an action might properly be brought by the
Attorney General of the state but, if he does not initiate the action,
I can see no reason why the door of the court should be closed to a
citizen and taxpayer who asks of the court only such relief as the
Constitution and justice require should be given to them. 24
Judge Seabury had no doubt as to his power to decide the case. He
rejected the argument that a political question was involved: "Whether
or not a majority did vote in favor of the proposition or against it is a
question of fact, and presents a judicial and not a political question.'12 5
The constitution prescribes the manner in which it may be amended.
Any other method of amendment is "illegal and revolutionary.' 1 26 If
a constitutional convention could be called by a fraudulent majority the
same method could be used to adopt the proposed constitution. Judge
Seabury was "unwilling to subscribe" to the idea that the "courts of
justice are powerless in such an emergency."127
However, Judge Seabury held for the state on the merits. He found
that the constitutional requirement of ten days between the comple-
tion of registration and the election had been complied with.128 The
remaining question was whether or not a majority had voted for the
proposition.129 Judge Seabury excluded the returns of fourteen election
districts on the ground of widespread fraud. With the returns excluded
he was obliged "to determine by other legal evidence what the vote
actually was."' 13 0 This would seem to be an ambitious task. Affidavits
from voters in the excluded districts (from negative voters) and the
Attorney General (from affirmative voters) were presented. The opinion
does not state what percentage of voters were covered by affidavits.
Judge Seabury in addition received undisputed proof from the Attorney
General of arithmetical error in Kings County causing an understate-
ment of 1,000 votes in favor of the proposition. Apparently the margin
against the proposition based on the affidavits did not exceed 1,000 and
Judge Seabury concluded that the convention call had received a
majority vote. The additional 1,000 votes found by the Attorney Gen-
eral in Brooklyn, therefore, saved the election.
troversies are cases involving the title to office, where an adequate remedy . . .
exists at law.
Id., 149 N.Y.S. at 258.
124 Id. at 686, 149 N.Y.S. at 259.
125 Id. at 685, 149 N.Y.S. at 258.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 As previously noted the failure to register argument was not presented to Judge
Seabury. See note 116 supra.
129 It does not appear that the question of what is a majority, i.e., the blank vote
issue, was argued to Judge Seabury.
130 86 Misc. at 691, 149 N.Y.S. at 262.
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Only three days after Judge Seabury's opinion the appellate divi-
sion rendered its opinion. Presiding Justice Ingraham, agreed with
Judge Seabury as to the court's power: "I have no doubt as to the
power of the court to intervene to prevent the election of delegates to
a constitutional convention" if the constitution had not been complied
with. 18 1 The court also accepted Judge Seabury's factual determination
that a majority of the effective votes cast was in favor of the proposition.
Two new legal arguments remained to be discussed.
Article II, § 4 of the constitution required a "registration of voters
... before each election."' 32 In the instant case Judge Ingraham thought
it clear that there "was no registration of voters."' 8 3 If, therefore, the
convention call was an "election," the constitution had been violated.
But Judge Ingraham was "inclined to think" that such a vote was not
an election. 13 4 Rather, he viewed it as a "meeting of electors to deter-
mine the question of the convention."'135 Or, the "election specified in
this article would seem to refer to the general elections whereby the
electors of the state elect the officers who are to be elected by the
people."'186 This position is not persuasive. The authorizing legislation
stated that a "special election shall be held."' 37 Moreover, the constitu-
tional requirement was intended to assure that eligible voters be given
the opportunity to vote. There is nothing to indicate that some narrow
meaning of the word "election" was intended. No reason supports a
rule which would require a registration before a vote for city council
but exclude eligible voters on matters dealing with the state's funda-
mental law. 8
'3' 163 App. Div. 742, 149 N.Y.S. 65.
132 The constitution then created an exception to the general rule stating that such
"registration shall not be required for town and village elections." This list of exceptions
was presumably complete.
1,3 163 App. Div. at 743, 149 N.Y.S. at 66. The statute authorizing the convention
call directed the inspectors in the various election districts to meet "for the purpose of
revising and correcting the register of voters" L. 1913 ch. 819 § 1. This language ap-
parently did not permit the original registration of new voters but only the correction of
existing lists.
134Id. The presiding Justice noted the "short time" available and his inability to
make an "exhaustive examination of the authorities" Id. at 745, 149 N.Y.S. at 67-68.
135 Id. at 745-46, 149 N.Y.S. at 68.
136 Id. at 744-45, 149 N.Y.S. at 67.
187 L. 1913 ch. 819, § 1, quoted in 212 N.Y. at 525, 106 N.E. at 676.
138In dissent, Judge Dowling thought it clear that "election" was "used in the
broadest sense, as including any exercise of the franchise by the voters of the state,
and not merely referring to their choice of officials." 163 App. Div. at 749, 149 N.Y.S. at 70.
Judge Dowling noted that the state's penal provisions for the punishment of fraud only
referred to elections. Fraud, "such as was practiced in this particular election" would
therefore be immune unless "election" were given a broader meaning in a criminal
statute than in the Constitution. Id.
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The blank vote argument was briefly discussed and rejected by
Judge Laughlin in a concurring opinion. The constitutional language,
it will be recalled, required a majority of "electors voting thereon."'39
Judge Laughlin noted, "voting a void or blank ballot is doubtless vot-
ing at the election, but it is not voting on the proposition." 140
The case was argued before the Court of Appeals on October 1 and
decided on October 23. As it reached the Court of Appeals it presented
a classic pattern where reliance on standing is to be expected. To rule
against the government and overturn the election would plainly involve
the court in political turmoil. On the other hand, the election did not
seem worthy of support. Enough fraud had been found to exclude the
return from fourteen election districts. Also, no registration of new
voters had been permitted despite the clear constitutional requirement.
In addition, the shortage of time was an aggravating factor. 41
The Court of Appeals, relying on Doolittle, held no standing.
Judge Chase, for the Court, stated:
We are of the opinion that there is no inherent power in a court
of equity to set aside a statute as unconstitutional except in a con-
troversy between litigants where it is sought to enforce rights or
to enjoin, redress or punish wrongs affecting the individual life,
liberty or property of one or more of the litigants. The court has
no inherent power to right a wrong unless thereby the civil,
property or personal rights of the plaintiff in the action or the
petitioner in the proceeding are affected.
The rights to be affected must be personal as distinguished
from the rights in common with the great body of people.142
Judge Dowling also found that the ten day requirement had not been met since 10
full calendar days had not elapsed between the dose of registration and the election.
139 N.Y. CONSr. art. XIV, § 2 (1894).
140 163 App. Div. at 748, 149 N.Y.S. at 69.
141 Komfort therefore presents a situation where the Court will be strongly drawn
to a no standing position. In other cases it is almost certain that the Court will not rely
on standing. For example, definite problems would arise were the Court to rule that it
could not discuss the merits of the state's liberalized abortion law because of a lack of
standing. The public would undoubtedly question the value of a Court which had so
hamstrung itself that it could not discuss the legality of basic public issues. Both pro-
ponents and opponents of the disputed law accept the idea of judicial review. It is
doubtful if an aggrieved person, in a St. Clair sense, could have been found or devised
to test the abortion law. Mr. Byrn appeared before the Court to challenge the law assert-
ing that he had been appointed guardian ad litem for all fetuses under 24 weeks gesta-
tion in the New York City hospitals. This extraordinary appointment was not questioned
by the Court of Appeals. With no discussion of the standing issue it ruled on the merits
of the law. Byrn v. N. Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.K2d 887, 335
N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972).
142212 N.Y. at 529-80, 106 N.E. at 677. The court, reminiscent of Judge Denio,
stated that courts should not assert jurisdiction to prevent public wrongs simply because
there is "no other immediate remedy." Id. at 536, 106 N. at 679. To clearly state the
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Halsey, which sharply curtailed the authority of Doolittle, was not cited
by the court. The court did, however, make one new argument in sup-
port of a no standing rule. It noted that the constitution specifically
provided that apportionment "shall be subject to review by the Su-
preme Court, at the suit of any taxpayer.' 1 43 In view of this provision,
added by the 1894 Convention, the court reasoned that the Convention
had focused on the standing question and determined that only in the
apportionment area would citizen suits be permitted.1' The argument
has considerable force but the particular does not seem to support the
thesis. Seven years earlier, Judge Chase himself had written that the
provision was intended to "set at rest" the claim that the "[lMegislature
in passing an act reapportioning the state for legislative purposes is so
far exercising a political, as distinguished from a legislative, power, that
its action cannot be reviewed by the courts."'145 The provision conse-
quently was concerned with the political question issue rather than
standing.14
"no standing" rule, however, it does not prohibit only "immediate" remedy, it prohibits
any remedy.
143 N.Y. CoNsr. art. M, § 5 (1894).
'44 212 N.Y. at 529, 106 N.E. at 677. The specific provision, the court noted,
is of itself evidence that it was not the intention of the people by the Constitution
to confer upon the judicial branch of government general authority at the suit
of a citizen as such to sit in review of the acts of other branches of government.
Id.
145 In re Sherill, 188 N.Y. 185, 195, 81 N.E. 124, 127 (1907).
140 The present Constitution contains three express provisions permitting citizen suits.
(l)Apportionment - Article UI, § 5 contains the provision discussed in text in
exactly the language added by the 1894 Convention.
(2) Comptroller - Article V, § 1 provides that the payment of any state funds
"except upon audit by the comptroller, shall be void, and may be restrained
upon the suit of any taxpayer with the consent of the supreme court." The pro-
vision was added by the 1938 Convention after introduction by Judge Francis
Bergan, who had written a lower court opinion in Kuhn and later became a
Court of Appeals judge. He explained the intent of this provision as follows:
This is designed to put some teeth into the requirement that the Comptroller
shall audit all moneys of the State, and the provision in respect of the consent
of the Appellate Division is to prevent unnecessary or vexatious suits.
1938 CoNVmrNON 2351.
Judge Bergan did not state whether the premise of his provision was (1) that a
taxpayer suit was otherwise impossible or (2) that the status of taxpayer suits
was unclear and a specific provision was needed to remove any question. The
latter seems more likely particularly since Judge Bergan, in his 1944 Kuhn opin-
ion, indicated a thorough knowledge of the mandamus cases.(3) Forest Preserve - Article XIV (Conservation) of the constitution imposes a
number of restraints upon the legislature including the requirement that the
existing forest preserve "shall be forever kept as wild forest lands." Art. XIV,
§ 1. Section 4 provides that a "violation of any of the provisions of this article
may be restrained at the suit of the people or, with the consent of the supreme
court in appellate division, on notice to the Attorney General at the suit of any
citizen." This provision was added to the constitution by amendment in 1913.
1938 Report, Vol. H at 574-75. No legislative history of interest has been found.
See Oneida County Forest Preserve Council v. Wehle, 309 N.Y. 152, 128 NXE.2d
282 (1955).
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In Komfort the court adopted a strong "no standing" position. It
is not surprising that the St. Clair court would quote extensively from
the opinion. But the court soon had to limit the authority of Komfort.
The aftermath of both Doolittle and Komfort shows a remarkably simi-
lar pattern. Within nine years, Doolittle was severely qualified by Hal-
sey; within twelve years Komfort was severely qualified by McCabe v.
Voorhis.147 In Voorhis Judge Pound noted that standing was questioned
relying "on some expressions" in the Komfort opinion.148 But Komfort
had only held that a citizen could not maintain "an action in equity";
it in no way overruled the long line of authority which holds that a
"citizen and elector has a sufficient interest to make the application for
an order of mandamus to compel the performance by a public officer
of a public duty."'1
49
The court, therefore, returned to a more flexible position, away
from the brittleness of "no standing." A "no standing" rule seems to
have a life expectancy of about ten years. During that time its primary
attributes appear: (1) the creation of an imbalance of power in favor of
the executive and legislative branches and (2) a growing sense of futility
with respect to the discarded constitution.
The final case relied upon by the St. Clair court is Bull v. Stich-
man.150 The Court of Appeals wrote no opinion in this case. Bull in-
volved the well known "Blaine" amendment which provides that
neither the state nor any subdivision "shall use its property or credit
. . . in aid of... any school . .. under the control of or direction of
any religious denomination."'151
Governor Dewey, in 1946, sent a message to the legislature stating,
"[t]he return of great numbers of veterans who interrupted their
schooling to serve the Nation in time of war will place unprecedented
demands upon the educational facilities of this State."' 5 2 The Governor
recommended the passage of several bills to provide public aid for
educational facilities and housing accommodations of higher educational
institutions.15 3 The legislature appropriated $35,000,000 for these pur-
.47 243 N.Y. 401, 153 N.E. 849 (1926).
148 Id. at 411, 153 N.E. at 851.
149 Id. Pound continued:
This distinction is recognized in the Komfort case and is not disturbed thereby.
Id. The "distinction" is hardly clear or persuasive. What is clear is the court's desire to
avoid the harshness of a "no standing" rule.
150 298 N.Y. 516, 80 N.E. 661 (1948), af'g 273 App. Div. 311, 78 N.Y.S.2d 279 (3d
Dep't 1948).
151 N.Y. CONsr. art. XI, § 3.
152 Bull v. Stichman, 189 Misc. 590, 592, 72 N.Y.S.2d 202, 203 (Sup. Ct. Albany County
1947).
153 L. 1946 chs. 680, 681.
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poses.'54 Title to the state-constructed facilities was to remain in the
state and the facilities were to be subject to removal at the end of the
emergency.155 The litigation involved a state allocation of $128,000 to
convert the Sister of Charity Hospital of Canisius College into class-
rooms. 56 Canisius College was operated by the Jesuit Order of the
Roman Catholic Church. Plaintiff asserted that the proposed rehabilita-
tion amounted to an unconstitutional "gift" since the "architect's plans
disclose that the State will not be able to remove any additions, appli-
ances or improvements.' '1 7 He sought a preliminary injunction and de-
claratory judgment that the allocation was unconstitutional. His motion
for injunction was denied and his complaint dismissed on the grounds
that he had no standing.158 On appeal to the appellate division the lower
court decisions were upheld in reliance on Doolittle and Komfort.5 9
No mention was made of Halsey and Voorhis. Plaintiff castigated the no
standing rule, terming it "the last degenerate surviving fragment of the
ancient belief in the divinity of kings."'160 The appellate division con-
sidered the "no standing" rule as well established, noting that the "only
semblance of assistance" for plaintiff came from Kuhn and Heim." In
the first Kuhn case the plaintiff brought an action for declaratory judg-
ment declaring a law to be unconstitutional. 162 Judge Bergan informed
the plaintiff, in effect, that he had "bought the wrong writ." Doolittle
and Komfort had held that declaratory judgment could not be main-
tained and the question "must be reached by some other remedy than
this." 16 Judge Bergan explained the success citizens had had in main-
taining mandamus proceedings. He noted the theory that in "man-
damus the compulsion was exercised at the instance of the people as
the sovereign power having an interest in seeing to it that the law was
carried out in public matters, and the people were moved to act at the
154 189 Misc. at 593, 72 N.Y.d at 204.
55 Id. at 593, 72 N.Y.S.2d at 204.
156 Id. at 593, 72 N.Y.S.2d at 205.
157 273 App. Div. at 314, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
158 189 Misc. at 597, 72 N.Y.S.2d at 202 (Sup. Ct. Albany 1947) and 189 Misc. 602, 72
N.Y.S.2d 492 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1947).
159 273 App. Div. 311, 78 N.Y.S.2d 279 (3d Dep't 1948).
'60 Id. at 316, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 283.
161Id. at 314, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 281. Kuhn, it will be recalled, established what this
article calls the "important issue" exception. Chief Judge Lehman stated: "[i]n view of the
importance to the public of an authoritative determination of that question to the
present time, we do not pause to consider whether this question is presented in appro-
priate proceedings" 294 N.Y. at 213, 61 NE.2d at 515. The existence of the "important
issue" exception should require a finding that an issue is unimportant if standing is to be
denied.
162 Kuhn v. Curran, 184 Misc. 788, 56 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1944).
163 Id, at 792, 56 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
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suggestion or relation of one of the public."' 6'1 The plaintiff took Judge
Bergan's advice and returned with a mandamus.165 Judge Bergan then
held against the plaintiff on the merits. 166 The Court of Appeals
reversed Judge Bergan and the statute was held unconstitutional. The
appellate division in Bull queried the validity of Judge Bergan's dis-
tinction: "grave doubts may be entertained as to the soundness of any
attempted distinction between the two" actions.167 The appellate divi-
sion was not impressed with the authority of Kuhn: "At best, the case
merely holds that if the question is not raised and the matter is of great
public exigency" the court may decide it. 6  It is odd to view Kuhn as a
case where the standing issue was "not raised." Further, assuming it to
be such a case, a court adhering to a no standing rule would be obliged
to dimiss, whether the issue was raised or not, since jurisdiction cannot
rest on consent. The Court of Appeals' affirmance, without opinion, of
the appellate division seems subject to at least three possible interpreta-
tions: (1) the affirmance indicates complete agreement with the reason-
ing of the appellate division; (2) the affirmance is based on Judge
Bergan's reasoning in the first Kuhn case, i.e., that delaratory judgment
could not be maintained; or (3) that the complaint was properly dis-
missed for failure to state a cause of action since, on the merits there
could be no violation of the constitution. In St. Clair Judge Burke
wrote that the Bull affirmance eliminated the "important issue" excep-
tion of Kuhn and "disposed of the theory that the rule regarding tax-
payers' cases permitted exceptions."'169
In sum, the cases relied on by St. Clair, Doolittle, Komfort and Bull
do not establish a strong line of authority. Doolittle and Komfort were
quicky qualified by the court and Bull's meaning is unclear in the
absence of an opinion. The strength of the "no standing" rule in New
York must rest on St. Clair itself.
III. PRE-ST. CLAIR HISTORY OF CITIZEN SUITS
A. Mandamus
"In theory the people are always the plaintiffs and they are actually
so when individual right is out of the case.' 170 This early description
164 Id. at 791, 56 N.YS.2d at 740.
165 183 Misc. 942, 53 N.Y.S.2d 30 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1945).
166 Id. The appellate division in Bull erroneously reports that Judge Bergan held
"that the act was unconstitutional." 273 App. Div. at 314, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 281.
167id., 78 N.Y.S.2d at 282.
168 Id. at 315, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 283.
169 13 N.Y.2d at 76, 192 N.E.2d at 16, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
170 People v. Collins, 19 Wend. 56, 67 (Sup. Ct. 1837).
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of the writ of mandamus and its successor, the article 78 proceeding, was
the most important source of citizen suits in the period prior to St. Clair.
Historically, the high perogative writ of mandamus "never issues
but to command the performance of some public duty."'1' The nature
of the writ is evident from the style of its title - "The People of the
State of New York on the relation of" the citizen making application
against the defendant public officer. It is said that mandamus will com-
pel an officer to perform a "ministerial act."'172 If the officer is vested
with discretion mandamus can only compel him to make a decision one
way or the other.173 While the remedy by mandamus was at law it was
considered necessary that "the person applying for it must be without
any other specific and legal remedy."'174
In 1837, Justice Cowen explained the citizen's rights to maintain a
mandamus as follows:
In such cases the wrongful refusal of the officers to act is
no more the concern of one citizen than another, like many other
public offenses. It is, at least, the right if not the duty of every
citizen to interfere and see that a public offense be properly
pursued and punished and that a public grievance be remedied.
In Rex v. White, Rep. T. Hardu. 92, speaking of a mandamus
for a public, as distinguished from a private object, Ld. Hardwicke
said: "The reason why we grant these writs is to prevent a failure
of justice, and for the execution of the common law, or of some
statute, or of the King's charter."'175
The language of both Justice Cowen and Lord Hardwicke is congenial
to the citizen suit. The citizen is not considered as a vexatious litigator.
If there is no merit to his claim the writ will not issue. If there is merit,
the citizen has prevented a "failure of justice." In the Collins case the
legislature had authorized two state commissioners to lay out a public
road from the village of Earlville to a point near the "house now oc-
cupied by Hazard Wilcox, Jr." The act directed the Highway Commis-
sioners of the towns along the route to "open and work so much of the
highway as lay in that town." The Commissioners of the Town of
Smyrna refused. The state commissioners thereupon sought a manda-
mus ordering the Town Commissioners to comply with the statute. The
11 Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 522, 650 (1838) (Barbour J., dissenting).
Justice Barbour further noted that the writ "issues, in England, only from the king's
bench, in which the king did formerly actually sit in person; and in which, in con-
templation of law, by his judges, he is still supposed to sit." Id.
172 Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 177 (1924).
173 Id.
174 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 169 (1803).
'75 People v. Collins, 19 Wend. 56, 65.
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Town Commissioners resisted arguing that the state commissioners had
no interest in bringing the action which should be brought by the At-
torney General, if anyone. Justice Cowen agreed that the state comis-
sioners had "no interest beyond that of any other citizen in the State
... and the question is whether anyone may inform and obtain a man-
damus in such a matter."'17 Justice Cowen thought any citizen could
maintain an action ordering compliance with a statute, "here the people
are the real party."'u 7 The Justice did not consider the Attorney Gen-
eral to possess any monopoly powers with respect to the correction of
public wrongs. He noted:
There are many other cases in the books moved by private
persons, which were yet founded on matters of as general and
public a nature as those presented by the case at bar. No doubt
the Attorney General might very properly have moved in this case
and had all private citizens refused to interfere and give informa-
tion, it might have been necessary but, I cannot collect from any
of the books or the reason of the thing that he alone has power to
move.178
To Justice Cowen, the Attorney General, rather than the decisive of-
ficer created by St. Clair, was a last resort. Under Collins, a citizen had
no standing problem if remedy of mandamus was appropriate. That is,
if he could frame his relief in the form of an order against a public
officer requiring compliance with a statute or the constitution. The
mandamaus route has been a rich source of constitutional law - all
brought by nonpersonally aggrieved citizens. The following are some
of the more important examples:
(1) Kuhn v. Curran'1 9 - Construction of the Judiciary Article of
the constitution holding invalid legislation purporting to
create a new judicial district.
(2) Koenig v. Flynn8° - Court declared invalid concurrent resolu-
tion of legislature redistricting state for upcoming election
for House of Representatives. The Court held that legislation
was required.
(3) McCabe v. Voorhisl81 - Court held invalid, as conflicting with
176 Id. at 64-65.
177 Id. at 65.
1781d. at 67.
179 294 N.Y. 207, 61 N.E. 513 (1945).
180 258 N.Y. 292, 179 N.E. 705 (1932). The federal Constitution provides that the
manner of holding elections for representatives "shall be prescribed in each state by the
Legislature thereof." Art. I, § 4. The difference was the role of the Governor - he could
veto legislation but had nothing to do with a concurrent resolution. The court held that
the Governor was part of the legislative process.
181243 N.Y. 401, 153 N.E. 849 (1926). The action arose by a mandamus against the
City Board of elections to strike from the ballot a proposition submitting the local law
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state regulatory scheme, a local law dealing with the 50 sub-
way fare.
(4) Daley v. Board of State Canvassers'8 2 - Court eliminated re-
turn for Dutchess County in election for state senator on the
basis of election irregularities. 8 3
(5) Anderson v. Rice184 -Construction of Civil Service A.rticle
of Constitution holding invalid law purporting to authorize
State Police Superintendent to appoint without competitive
examination. 8 5
(6) People v. Halsey'8 6 -Court issued mandamus to County
Treasurer ordering his warrant for collection of a tax.1s7
to the people. The court had earlier held that a local board of elections could not be
reached by a taxpayer's action under present section 51 of the General Municipal Law.
In re Reynolds, 202 N.Y. 430, 96 N.E. 87 (1911).
182 129 N.Y. 449, 29 N.E. 355 (1891).
1s3 In reaching this conclusion, Judge Peckham noted:
It is a matter in which the public has an interest quite as great, perhaps as the
individual, and in such event any citizen has the right to invoke the proper
judicial tribunal to compel the performance by a public officer of a public duty.
Id. at 454, 29 N.E. at 356.
184 277 N.Y. 271, 14 N.E.2d 65 (1938).
185 Objection was made to the plaintiff's standing since he had made no application
for a state police job. Chief Judge Crane rejected this argument, stating:
He is of age to make such application, but, more than that, he is a citizen and
resident of the state of New York, and being such, is capable of presenting to
the courts his petition for the enforcement by officials of their mandatory duties.
Id. at 281, 14 N.E.2d at 69.
186 37 N.Y. 344 (1867).
187 The case arose before the enactment of what is now § 51 of the General Municipal
Law. In 1851 the state imposed a tax on debts owed to non-residents. In Steuben County
three non-residents, including the Earl of Craven, reported $6,505 owed to them by
residents of the town of Fremont. The assessors, however, determined that $50,000 was
the correct amount owed to this group and that a $2,126 tax was due. The County
Treasurer, relying on the reported $6,505, refused to proceed with collection of the larger
figure. The Court of Appeals ordered collection on the basis of the larger figure. The
mandamus was sought by one Stephens, a citizen and taxpayer of Steuben County. The
court observed that the propriety of such a proceeding had been established in the
"well-considered" Collins case. But in between Collins (1837) and Halsey (1867) had come
Doolittle v. Supervisors of Broome County, 18 N.Y. 155 (1858). Doolittle was considered
by the St. Clair court to have established the "no-citizen standing" rule in New York. Did
Doolittle overrule or limit Collins? The court thought not.
Inasmuch as the people themselves are the plaintiffs in a proceeding by manda-
mus, it is not of vital importance who the relator should be so long as he does
not officiously intermeddle in a matter with which he has no concern. The office
which a relator performs is merely the instituting of a proceeding in the name
of the people and for the general benefit. The rule, therefore, as it is some-
times stated, that a relator in a writ of mandamus must show an individual right
to the thing asked, must be taken to apply to cases where an individual interest
alone is involved, and not to cases where the interest is common to the whole
community .... the practice which has so long prevailed here, though never,
so far as I can discover, passed upon directly by the court of last resort, where
the objection was raised, seems to be a reasonable and convenient one, and ought
now to the considered as settled.
This in no way conflicts with the decisions of this court in the case of Doo-
little v. Supervisors of Broome County where it was held that an action could
not be maintained by a person having no interest other than which was com-
mon to all the freeholders of a town, to have the act of a board of supervisors,
in erecting a new town, declared void. The case was properly decided. The dif-
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(7) Carter v. Rice'88 - Court upheld validity of the Apportion-
ment Act of 1892.189
(8) Baird v. Board of Supervisors'9o - Court found invalid the
apportionment of assembly districts in Kings County.191
B. Citizen Suits Against Local Officials
Actions against local officials have been an important source of
constitutional law in the state. This route takes on new importance
since St. Clair's general restraint on standing. If a state scheme requires
the action of local officials it is possible to challenge the scheme by suit
against the local official. The local official relies on the state law for his
authority and the state law consequently may be scrutinized (for ex-
ample, the South Mall project in a state scheme which requires the
issuance of Albany County bonds). The issuance of the bonds by the
local officials would be unlawful if the basic state financing plan is un-
lawful. Consequently, the South Mall project could be challenged by an
action against an Albany County official. 19 2
Since 1872, New York citizen-taxpayers have been permitted to
sue city and other local officials to prevent "any illegal official act."'19
ference between a case, where an individual acts as relator or representative of
the people to redress a public wrong by mandamus, and one where it is sought
to accomplish the same result by an individual in an action brought in his own
name, is strikingly apparent.
87 N.Y. at 347. As the court notes, the "same result" is attempted in both cases. The
"strikingly apparent" difference, therefore, is purely procedural.
188 135 N.Y. 473, 31 N.E. 921 (1892).
189 The constitution required that each senate and assembly district "shall contain,
as nearly as may be, an equal number of inhabitants." The Apportionment Act of 1892
would be invalid if the quoted language required mathematical exactness or at least
something dose to it. The majority of the Court, however, found that the language "is
a direction addressed to the legislature in the way of a general statement of principles
upon which the apportionment shall be made." Id. at 501, 31 N.E. at 929. Unless the
legislature "grossly abused" the "discretion intrusted" to it, the apportionment would be
sustained.
190 138 N.Y. 95, 3 N.E. 827 (1898).
191 The Board of Supervisors was directed by the statute to legally divide Kings
County into 18 assembly districts. As divided, one district contained 81,000 and another,
102,000. The court observed that Rice had not been intended to sanction such variations.
The writ of mandamus was granted ordering another division. Rice and Baird are dis-
cussed in 3 LINCOLN, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORy OF Nmv YoRK 198-204 (1905).
192 The local suit involving state law does not seem to have been affected by St. Clair.
At least to date, local officials have not argued that the legality of their authority cannot
be questioned because of St. Clair, i.e., a citizen cannot do indirectly what he could not
do directly.
193 N.Y. GEN. MUN. § 51 (McKinney 1965). This provision originated in an 1872 law
(Act of April 2, 1872, Laws of N.Y. ch. 161 (1872). Curiously, St. Clair raises serious doubts
as to the validity of General Municipal Law section 51. If the law is invalid, city and
other local governments would seem entitled to the state's St. Clair immunity. The con-
tinued validity of the statute seems questionable since St. Clair raises the standing issue
to a constitutional status. We are informed by St. Clair that the "no standing" rule is
required by the separation of powers, to prevent "interference" by the judiciary with the
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The law was intended to provide a remedy for municipal taxpayers
against the practice of local officials fraudulently issuing town bonds
for the benefit of railroads.194 City and local officials would undoubtedly
view the provision as a cause of some inefficiency in government. For
example, new local laws or regulations may be inoperative pending the
outcome of protracted litigation. This inefficiency, which greatly con-
cerned Judge Denio in Broome, however, seems acceptable to the local
governments and the public.195
A state law, which requires local action, is, consequently, subject
to judicial attack because of § 51. If the state law is invalid, the local
official's act is without lawful authority and may be restrained. 19
The local suit is further significant to the standing issue because
it may form the basis for a direct suit against the state. In November,
1945, the people adopted an amendment to the constitution's civil ser-
vice article providing for veterans' perferences.' 9 7 The amendment
established an exception to the normal civil service requirement of
appointment according to merit and fitness as determined by examina-
tion. The exception was to apply to veterans "whose disability is cer-
tified" by the Veterans Administration. The problem arose because
the Administration would certify a veteran with a minor disability as
0-10% disability. This certification had no apparent significance to the
Administration since disability pensions were awarded only if the dis-
ability reached 10%. It was, of course, significant in terms of New
York's constitutional amendment. By its terms, the amendment applied
to the "state and all of the civil divisions thereof." New York City was
sued when it granted a disability preference to a veteran (certified 0%-
10%) raising him from 134th on a Fire Department lieutenant's list to
other branches. But if the "no standing" rule is a constitutional principle it obviously
cannot be altered by a simple statute. General Municipal Law section 51 would therefore
be unconstitutional. In fact, of course, the "no standing" rule had no constitutional
pretensions until St. Clair. Previously, the court had treated standing more as a procedural
issue than a substantive one. Certainly, the passage of the original 1872 version of section
51 indicates that the draftsmen and legislature did not believe they were dealing with
any constitutional principles.
194 See Matter of Reynolds, 202 N.Y. 480, 96 N.E. 87 (1911); Ayers v. Lawrence, 59
N.Y. 192 (1874).
L95 It will be further noted that a city or local government is more susceptible to
litigation than the state government would be. Each contact between government and a
citizen is a potential source of litigation and local government touches the lives of its
citizens far more frequently than the state government does or would. Police, fire, health,
welfare, land and business regulation are all local functions. The state, on the other
hand, builds highways and imposes taxes, but has comparatively little to do with the
lives of its citizens. In short, the localities of the state have long carried a far heavier
burden than the state would bear if St. Clair were overruled.
196 Rathbone v. Wirth, 150 N.Y. 459, 45 N.E. 15 (1896).
197 N.Y. CONsr. art. V, § 6.
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first. The Court of Appeals interpreted the constitutional amendment
as requiring a disability of at least 10% before a veteran was entitled to
preference. 19 s
Subsequently, an action was brought against the State Tax Com-
mission asserting that it made the same mistake as had the City and
improperly granted preferences to less than 10% disabled veterans. 99
The Tax Commission replied that the plaintiff could obtain no relief
because the 1942 civil service list they claimed under had expired in
1948. Apparently the argument was made that since the plaintiffs could
not be aided by the outcome they had no standing. The Court agreed
with the Tax Commission that plaintiffs could not be personally bene-
fited by its decision. However, the merits of the question should be
reached because "as citizens and taxpayers" they are entitled to insist
upon the proper interpretation of the state constitution. The court
observed:
Even so, the erroneous appointments - though made in good
faith -ought to be open to attack by the petitioners, because as
citizens and taxpayers they are entitled to an opportunity to insist
upon the construction which this court placed upon the civil
service article of the State Constitution in Matter of Carey v.
Morton . . ."200
The court held that the appointments had been improperly made and
ordered removal of the veterans unless special circumstances made
removal unfeasible.
The court therefore recognized the right of a citizen "to insist
upon the construction" which the court had placed upon the constitu-
tion. The case could be narrowly read as permitting citizen standing
only if the court had previously decided the precise issue involved. As
such, the rule only assured that local and state agencies would follow a
108 Carey v. Morton, 297 N.Y. 361, 79 N.E.2d 442 (1948). Almost forty years before,
the Court of Appeals had held that a municipal civil service commission is not subject to
§ 51 because its members carry out the provisions of the State Civil Service Law and "are
not the servants of the municipality." Slavin v. McGuire, 205 N.Y. 84, 98 N.E. 405 (1942).
The plaintiffs alleged the unconstitutionality of an amendment to the civil service rules.
The court noted that a taxpayer's action was an "inappropriate" remedy; the commis-
sion's acts are executive and ministerial and "therefore are to be reached, when they
become the subject of judicial inquiry, by writ of mandamus." Id. at 87, 98 N.E. at 406.
(See section A, supra). Nonetheless, the court determined the merits of the litigation on
the grounds that it is in the "interest of the state that litigation should cease and because
the question is of some public importance." Id. The standing issue was not discussed in
the Carey case but the plaintiffs appear to have been personally aggrieved.
199 Cash v. Bates, 301 N.Y. 258, 93 N.E.2d 835 (1950). The plaintiffs sought removal
of the improperly appointed veterans and appointment of themselves. The court found
the second part of the relief sought impossible because the civil service list that the
plaintiffs claimed under had expired. Consequenlty, the plaintiffs could not be "personally
aggrieved" in a St. Clair sense.
200 Id. at 261, 93 N.E2d at 836.
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uniform construction. But two years later, the court held that such a
narrow reading was not intended. And that the rule would permit citi-
zen standing based on the constitution whether or not the court had
previously construed the language or determined the issue.
The constitution provides that appointments to the civil service
shall be made according to merit and fitness ascertained as far as prac-
ticable, by examinations which "shall be competitive." 201 On October
22, 1949, the New York City Civil Service Commission held a promo-
tional examination for the position of electrical engineer. The exam
required complex mathematical calculations and candidates were con-
sequently permitted to bring in handbooks, tables and other literature.
The difficulty arose because five of the exam questions were taken
directly from a popular cram course booklet written by "one William
Glendinning."212 It was unknown whether any of the candidates had the
Glendinning book with them but it seemed probable. The Commission
attempted to cure the taint by holding a supplemental exam for those
who had answered the Glendinning questions (50 out of 92 candi-
dates). 203 The results of the supplemental questions were combined with
the untainted answers on the original. The plaintiffs, failed candidates,
then brought an action to set both exams aside. Judge Van Voorhis, for
the Appellate Division, held that the merits of the plaintiffs' claim,
the injustice of the supplemental exam, need not be reached because
they were not aggrieved parties. They were not aggrieved parties since
they had failed the first exam, which had been graded on an absolute
standard, even with the tainted questions included.204 All this was too
much for the Court of Appeals which reversed, throwing out both
exams, on the grounds that the constitutionally required competitive
examination had not been given. The court observed:
Whether the petitioners who were unsuccessful candidates
are personally aggrieved is a question we need not decide. For
as citizens of the State they may insist upon competitive civil
service examinations as required by section 6 of article V of the
State Constitution.203
201 N.Y. CoNsr. art. V, § 6.
202 Chironna v. Watson, 279 App. Div. 199, 108 N.Y.S.2d 761, 762 (Ist Dep't 1951).
203 While the original exam had contained a number of questions from which the
candidate could choose, the supplemental exam contained no options. This was the basis
of the plaintiffs complaint that they had been denied the right of election which had
been enjoyed by those who had avoided the tainted questions on the original exam.
204 Because the test had been graded on an absolute standard, Judge Van Voorhis
did not believe the plaintiffs had been hurt, even if others had been aided by Glendin-
ning's book. In Judge Van Voorhis' view, the plaintiffs should not have been permitted
to take the supplemental exam.
205 Chironna v. Watson, 304 N.Y. 255, 259, 107 N.E.2d 289, 290 (1952), citing Cash v.
Bates, 301 N.Y. at 260, 93 N.2d 835.
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Chironna therefore held that any citizen, aggrieved or nonaggrieved,
had a right to insist on compliance with the constitution. The fact that
a local body (immune from § 51) was involved, rather than the state,
seems clearly immaterial in view of Cash v. Bates. It further seems im-
material that Chironna involved the constitutionality of governmental
actions rather than a statute. No meaningful distinctions can be drawn
between the two. Consequently, Cash v. Bates had been intended to
establish a broad principle. It was not necessary that the court had
previously determined the precise issue or even that the court had
construed the constitutional article involved. The case held that a
citizen could "insist" that government adhere to the constitution. That
doctrine would not seem startling until overruled by the repressive St.
Clair case.2°8
C. Important Issue Exception
In a 1912 decision the Court of Appeals held that it would deter-
mine the merits of a constitutional question despite the fact that the
action could not be maintained and had been properly dismissed
below. The court explained, "as it is for the interest of the state that
litigation should cease and because the question is of some public
importance," the merits would be decided. 207 This is perhaps the ear-
liest expression of the important issue exception. The doctrine reached
its fullest expression in the language of Chief Judge Lehman as follows:
In view of the importance to the public of an authoritative
determination of that question at the present time, we do not
pause to consider whether the question is presented in appropriate
proceedings. Sufficient, at present, that a controversy exists between
the parties to the proceedings immediately affecting them, and that
all parties entitled to be heard in regard to the question involved
are here represented.2 08
The essential idea of the important issue exception seems simple and
unarguable. If a "controversy exists between the parties" and the
issues have been properly presented technicalities should not prevent
a decision. Major constitutional issues should be resolved; indeed, such
resolution is the highest business of the court. The important issue
doctrine considers standing to be a technicality; a constitutional princi-
ple could not be waived.
206 The St. Clair court did not cite Chironna.
207 Slavin v. McGuire, 205 N.Y. 84, 88, 98 N.E. 405, 406 (1912).
208 Kuhn v. Curran, 294 N.Y. 207, 61 N.E.2d 513 (1945). For a discussion of Kuhn see
notes 161-64 supra and accompanying text.
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In 1909 the legislature enacted § 14 of the Labor Law2 9 providing
that all public works by the state or its subdivisions shall employ
only United States citizens and that preference be given to New York
citizens. Each public works contract was to provide that if aliens were
hired in violation of § 14, the contract was void. Shortly thereafter
contracts were let for the construction of an expanded New York City
subway system. The contracts were let by the Public Service Com-
mission, a state body with jurisdiction over the construction of City
subways.
In the course of construction, large numbers of aliens were em-
ployed; the aliens were "subjects of the King of Italy."2 10 The Supreme
Court later found that it was "necessary" to employ the aliens to per-
form the contract at the contract price ($250 million) and that ap-
parently this was known to all involved.21' The Court further found
that the contracts were in various stages of execution, some 75 percent
completed, and that termination of the contracts would result in a
"waste of money to the city."212 Heim, as a taxpayer, sought to enjoin
the Public Service Commission from declaring the contracts void.
Heim asserted that forfeiture would cause irreparable loss to the city.
After defeat at Special Term, Heim appealed to the Appellate
Division. The Appellate Division noted that Heim's position might
be tenuous in view of the Court of Appeals recent Komfort decision.
However, it observed:
In the present case, however, this objection is not raised by the
respondent, and since it is represented to us that the matter is one
of great public exigency, as to which all parties interested seem to
desire a speedy determination, we have concluded to pass upon
the appeal upon its merits. 213
The Appellate Division found that statute excluding aliens to
violate both the state constitution and the fourteenth amendment of
the Federal Constitution.
Surprisingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division
on the basis of an opinion by Judge Cardozo.214 Cardozo held that
the state could "discriminate in the distribution of the public wealth in
209 L. 1909 ch. 36.
210 Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 193 (1915).
211 Id. at 181.
212 Id. at 181-82.
213 Helm v. McCall, 165 App. Div. 449, 452, 150 N.Y.S. 933, 936 (Ist Dep't 1914).
214 Helm v. McCall, 214 N.Y. 629, 108 N.E. 109 (1915). The Cardozo opinion was
written in a companion case, People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427 (1915) involving
criminal charges against a sewer basin contractor.
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favor of the citizen." 216 The case was appealed to the United States
Supreme Court which agreed with Cardozo.216 Before reaching the
merits, however, the Court commented on standing. It noted that Heim
was neither a contractor nor an excluded laborer. The Court con-
tinued:
The appellate division felt that there might be objection to the
right, under the holding of a cited case. The court of appeals,
however, made no comment, and we must - certainly may - as-
sume that Heim had a right of suit; and, so assuming, we pass to
the merits. 217
The failure of Judge Cardozo to comment on the standing question
is, of course, regrettable. But it is at least clear from his silence that
he did not consider standing to be a constitutional issue. If, as the
St. Clair court held, the no-standing objection is rooted in the con-
stitutional separation of powers, it is evident that the Appellate Di-
vision was wrong in reaching the merits whether or not the issue was
of "great public exigency." Judge Cardozo, however, acquiesced in the
Appellate Division standing approach although reversing on the merits.
Similarly, the Supreme Court took the position that it was permitted
to reach the merits. Consequently, neither the Supreme Court nor
the Court of Appeals viewed standing as did the St. Clair court. It was
not premised on a constitutional, and therefore non-waivable, princi-
ple. It was a rule of convenience. If the parties did not make an issue
of it, or if the question was important, a lack of standing would be
disregarded and the merits reached.
A further aspect of the "important issue" doctrine requires, at
least implicitly, a finding that a given issue is unimportant before
standing can be considered. St. Clair has blocked consideration of the
Constitution's essential fiscal provisions, e.g., violations of the referen-
dum requirement for state debt and the use of lump sum budgets.
There should not be any question that these issues are "important."
Kuhn and Heim were expressly rejected by the St. Clair court.
IV. POST ST. CLAmR-BUDGET PROCEDURE AND DEBT
New York, by an amendment of 1928, adopted what is known
as an executive budget system. Under this system the preparation and
215 214 N.Y. at 163, 108 N.E. at 429-30. Judge Cardozo noted:
the common property of the state belongs to the people of the state.... The
construction of public works involves the expenditures of public moneys. To
better the condition of its own citizens, and, it may be, to prevent pauperism
among them, the Legislature had declared that the moneys of the state shall go
to the people of the state.
Id. at 162, 108 N.E. at 429.
210 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
217 Id. at 186-87.
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submission of the budget are the responsibilities of the Governor.218
The constitution provides that the head of each department shall
furnish to the Governor "estimates," in such form and at such times
as he may require, of the department's budget needs for the coming
fiscal year.219 Copies of these estimates are to be furnished to the ap-
propriate legislative committees.220 The Governor shall then hold
hearings and require the attendance of department heads.221 Designated
members of the legislative committees may attend and take part in
the hearings. However the budget for the judicial and legislative
departments does not follow this procedure. Instead, they make "[i]tem-
ized estimates of their financial needs" which shall be transmitted to
the Governor, not later than December 1, "for inclusion in the budget
without revision but with such recommendations as he may deem
proper. ' 222 On or before February 1, 223 the Governor shall submit to
the legislature "a budget containing a complete plan of expenditures
. . . and all moneys and revenues to be available therefor." 224 The
218 The need for improved fiscal management developed in the early 1900's as the
state undertook responsibilities for highways and parks and became more active in educa-
tion and social welfare. The operation of the pre-1928 appropriation system has been
explained as follows:
It became apparent to many people that spending on such an enlarged
scale necessitated a change in the existing haphazard fiscal policies of the State.
Public-spirited citizens pointed with scorn to weaknesses in the existing system
of legislative control over appropriations and the means of financing them. It was
revealed that even though the various administrative services were required to
submit to the Legislature estimates of their fiscal requirements, these represented
merely individual requests for funds. The collection and computation of requests
for appropriations in advance of the legislative session was not attempted. No
administrative officer acquainted with the entire business of the State reviewed
these estimates or compared them with previous outlays for the respective depart-
ments. No balanced budget was ever submitted to the Legislature. Every member
of the Legislature was permitted to introduce at any time as many appropriation
bills as he pleased. Nor was there any responsible officer to call attention to
possible discrepancies between the State's income and outgo resulting from the
daily enacted appropriaticn bills. The debate on appropriations was uninformed
and superficial. Minor appropriation bills, amounting to considerable sums, which
were passed after general appropriation bills received little scrutiny and no de-
bate. Since the Governor was not permitted to veto part of an item in a bill,
the Legislature passed dubious and essential appropriations within a single item
so as to prevent a possible veto. In short, the essence of a budget system, that
is a well formulated fiscal program with balanced receipts and expenditures so
necessary in this day of wide State activities was completely lacking.
N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION Comma., REPORT: PROBLEIf RELATING TO TAXATION
AND) FixNAcE 9-16 (1938). A clear picture of legislative supremacy is presented. Any threat
of a Governor's veto was eased by lumping "dubious and essential appropriations within
a single item."
219 N.Y. CONSr. art. VII, § 1.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 February 1 is the date fixed in case of a newly elected Governor. Otherwise, the
budget is to be submitted on the second Tuesday after the legislature meets. Id. art. VII,
§ 2. The legislature meets the "first Wednesday after the first Monday" in January. Id.
art. XIII, § 4.
224 Id. art. VII, § 2.
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Governor, consequently, is to submit a balanced budget to the legis-
lature. The budget itself has no legal significance. But at the time of
submitting the budget the Governor shall also submit a "bill or bills
containing all the proposed appropriations and reappropriations in-
cluded in the budget." 225 An appropriation is necessary for the payment
of any state funds and "shall distinctly specify the sum appropriated
and the object or purpose to which it is to be applied.1226 Within
30 days the Governor may amend or submit supplemental bills.227
If the legislature consents the Governor may amend or submit supple-
mental bills any time before adjournment.2 8 If requested by the legis-
lature the heads of departments shall appear and answer relevant in-
quiries.229 To this point, the constitutional provisions are largely
procedural and do not seem to require constitutional status to be
accomplished. When the amendment reaches the power of the legis-
lature, however, basic constitutional principles are involved. The
legislative power with respect to the Governor's appropriation bill is
described as follows:
4. The Legislature may not alter an appropriation bill submitted
by the Governor except to strike out or reduce items therein, but
it may add thereto items of appropriation provided that such
additions are stated separately and distinctly from the original
items of the bill and refer each to a single object or purpose.2380
The analytical difficulty with the section is that the prohibition "may
not alter an appropriation bill"- is followed by broad exceptions,
i.e., the power to strike, reduce, or add items. It will be noted that all
of the legislative power focuses on what are called "items," an unde-
fined term.
The constitution provides that such an appropriation bill when
passed shall become a law immediately without further act of the
Governor. However, "separate items added" by the legislature and the
judicial and legislative appropriations require the Governor's ap-
proval. 23 1
In addition to its power with respect to appropriations submitted
225 Id. § 3.
226 Id. § 7.
2271d. § 3.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id. § 4.
231 Article IV, § 7 provides the Governor with an item veto; he may "object to one
or more items [in an appropriation bill] while approving of the other portion of the
bill." In such case the objected to item shall not take effect unless two-thirds of the
legislature overrides the Governor's action.
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by the Governor, the legislature retains its independent appropriation
power. But the constitution requires that such appropriations must
be made "by separate bills each for a single object or purpose.10 2
On January 30, 1939 Governor Lehman submitted to the legis-
lature his budget and proposed appropriation bills.233 The proposed
budget called for expenditures of $415 million while existing taxes
were expected to collect $355 million.23 4 The Governor's budget there-
fore required new taxes to meet a deficit of $60 million. The legislature
resisted the new taxes and determined to reduce expenditures.238
The Governor's appropriation for each department was divided into
two main categories, personal service expenses and maintenance and
operations expenses. The personal service category included the "line
items," an accompanying itemized schedule showing amounts available
for "each of the various positions or groups of positions" for each
department.23 6 Similarly the maintenance and operation category in-
eluded "an itemized statement accompanying the schedule showing
the amounts which were to be available for various expenses." 23 The
Court of Appeals later noted that the Governor's submission "was in
accordance with the Constitution." 23 8 The legislature was now obliged
to exercise its constitutional power. It seemed clear that § 4, quoted
above, authorized the legislature to strike out or reduce any item or
to "strike them all out."239 In some instances the legislature did strike
them all out and substituted a lump sum appropriation.240 For example,
232 Id. art. VII, § 6. The language seems drawn from the basic referendum require-
ment provision that any debt of the state must be "for some single work purpose, to be
distinctly specified."
233 People v. Tremaine, 281 N.Y. 1, 5, 21 N.E.2d 891, 893 (1939).
234 NEVINS, A., HERBERT LmAN Am HIS ERA 202 (1963) [hereinafter NEVINS].
235 Id.
236 281 N.Y. at 6, 21 N.E.2d at 893.
2,37 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 NEVINS, supra note 234, writes: "The able Abbot Moffat and other party leaders
reclassified the itemized appropriations of the budget into large groups, determined the
costs for each group according to Lehman's figures, and then slashed three-fourths of
these groups. Their aggregate cuts came to about $26,000,000." Id. at 202. Of course, the
legislature could have selectively cut enough individual Lehman items to reach a $26,000,-
000 reduction. And this approach would have been legally unassailable since the legisla-
ture clearly had the power to strike or reduce an item. The legislature, however,
reasonably enough, did not feel that a selective cut approach would be responsible.
Another legally defensible method would have been to cut each item by a certain per-
centage, i.e., 5%, sufficient to give the desired overall reduction. The legislature's power
to reduce an item would seem to permit such a uniform percentage reduction approach.
This method was rejected apparently on the grounds that, if adopted, no government
function would be properly performed, each having been cut by the uniform percentage.
The course taken by the legislature, the lump sum appropriation, was the most reasonable
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an itemized appropriation for the Banking Department was stricken
and the following substituted.
For general expenses of maintenance and operation; including
personal service and travel outside of State not to exceed $3,000
.............. $965,000.241
The Attorney General brought an action, on behalf of the people,
to declare the legislative act unconstitutional and to restrain the Comp-
troller from making any payments pursuant to it.
242
The defendants basically thought that the itemization language of
the 1928 amendment was intended to bind the Governor rather than
the legislature. In other words the Governor must submit itemized ap-
propriations in aid of the legislature; but the legislative power was
not restrained, it could operate on items or lump them as it saw fit.
They thought that legislative supremacy over the appropriation process
had been fairly well established since the Stuart kings. Language in
the earlier Tremaine case supported their view as follows:
Long and interesting is the history of the struggle between the
Executive and the Legislature for the control of the public
moneys. It is, however, so well settled that the State legislature
is supreme in all matters of appropriation that the recital of the
details of the strife for legislative supremacy would serve no useful
purpose.243
However, the Court of Appeals determined that the 1928 amend-
ment had intended to alter the traditional legislative power. The legis-
lature retained control of the purse strings in the sense that it need
but legally perilous. The lump sum approach in essence gave the department head the
power to use the reduced amount to the best advantage.
241 281 N.Y. at 9, 21 N.E.2d at 895. Governor Lehman informed the legislature that
he was allowing the bill to become law without affimative action on his part "for the
sole purpose of having this issue of constitutionality" tested. People v. Tremaine, 257
App. Div. 117, 120, 13 N.Y.S.2d 125, 128, (3d Dep't 1939). A more recent example of a
lump sum appropriation is found in the 1972 proposed appropriation bill for the Office of
General Services. As submitted by the Governor this bill contained a line "Real Property
Services - $35,727,000" Brief of Comptroller at 7, Levitt v. Rockefeller, 69 Misc. 2d 337,
329 N.Y.S.2d 976 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1972). The Comptroller thought this was
divisible into at least 26 items ranging from $8,827,000 for leasing space in the World
Trade Center and $2,822,000 for the operation and maintenance of the South Mall. Id.
The bill as submitted gave no indication of what interesting items were buried in the
$35,727,000.
242 Standing was consequently not in question. The Attorney General is mandated
to "[prosecute and defend all actions and proceedings in which the state is interested."
N.Y. Exac. LAw § 63 (1) (McKinney 1972). In New York the Attorney General is generally
allied with the Governor. The Tremaine situation, where the legislature and Governor
are in dispute, is the only time that the Attorney General may be expected to challenge
the constitutionality of a statute.
248 252 N.Y. 27, 38, 168 NXE.2d 817, 820.
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make no appropriation. But if it attempts to make an appropriation,
its "method of action" is limited by the constitution. 2" It could not
strike out all the items in an appropriation bill and substitute lump
sums.2 45 That would be to "revert to the old system which years of
agitation and endeavor have sought to abolish.1246
The court observed that there are "small lump sum appropriations
which are necessary because of the uncertainty of events." 247 But the
constitution dearly required itemization if possible. The court noted:
The Constitution means that the budget, and the appropriation
bills accompanying it, shall be broken down into items sufficient
to show what money is to be expended, and for what purpose.248
After quoting § 4, the court explained further:
When, therefore, we are told that the Legislature may not alter
an appropriation bill submitted by the Governor, except to strike
out or reduce items therein, we expect the appropriation bill to
contain items. As stated before, the items must be sufficient to fur-
nish the information necessary to determine whether in the judg-
ment of the Legislature all that is demanded should be granted or
is required2 49
The court's almost casual comment that "we expect the appropriation
bill to contain items" did not foresee a time when the Governor would
submit appropriation bills without items and maintain that his bills
were non-challengable because of St. Clair.2 0
The court noted the direction of the constitutional language and
the need for good faith to make the system work. The key to the
system was appropriate itemization, neither overly detailed nor lumped.
But "item," after all, was not defined and could not be defined. The
court relied on observance of the "spirit of the Constitution." It
noted:
The present Constitution emphasizes the necessity of items,
not lump sums, for an entire department or bureau. On the other
hand there are cases in which it would be impracticable, if not
impossible, to itemize the sum required. Departments with uncer-
244 281 N.Y. at 11, 21 N.E2d at 895.
245 Id. at 10, 21 NXE-2d at 895.
246 Id. The reverse argument, i.e., that the 1928 amendment had conferred plenary
powers on the Governor was not contemplated by the court or parties.
247 Id. at 8-9, 21 N.E.2d at 894.
248 Id. at 5, 21 N.E.2d at 893.
249 Id.
250 Hidley v. Rockefeller, 28 N.Y.2d 15, 271 N.E.2d 530, 322 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1971);
Posner v. Rockefeller, 26 N.Y.2d 970, 259 N.E.2d 484, 311 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1970); Levitt v.
Rockefeller, 69 Misc. 2d 337, 329 N.Y.S.2d 976 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County 1972).
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tain contingent expenses or seasonal occupations, building or road
construction may require lump sum appropriations. We expect in
all these matters that the spirit of the Constitution shall be ob-
served and that good sense in its application will govern ...
It is easier to state a rule than to apply it. Many conditions arise
which create doubts. The utmost we can do is to state the funda-
mental principles in hopes that the parties acting under them will
give a practical and useful application. As said before, it is the
extreme which causes disputes or danger....
Again, the lump sum appropriation may be carried to the extreme
so that the theory of the Constitution is evaded. Here, too, the
way is clear. In between the two extremes we must rely upon the
Executive and Legislative branch of the government to provide a
budget sufficiently itemized to comply with the spirit and words of
the Constitution, and yet containing lump sum appropriations
when experience in the line of work or in the department shows
that details and items in a budget would be almost impossible
- unworkable.251
Chief Judge Crane plainly went to considerable length to point out
that clean line drawing was not possible in this difficult and imprecise
area. We "must rely upon the Executive and Legislative branch" to
observe the intent of the Constitution. Such reliance was not well
placed. Tremaine, in view of the long history of plenary legislative
power over money bills, could be considered an arguable case. But the
Court held that the legislature could not lump. Tremaine was perfectly
dear, however, that the 1928 amendment was not intended to reverse
300 years of history and reestablish a period of executive supremacy.
The executive was, of course, bound to itemize. Yet came an executive
who thought he had the power to lump. And if the power to lump
was insufficient he also had the power to "interchange," i.e., the power
to shift funds from one category to another.252 The interchange power
is even more interesting than the lump sum power since it makes
meaningless even a properly itemized appropriation. 253
251 281 N.Y. at 7, 11-12, 21 NXE.2d at 894.
252 An interchange provision is quoted in the Comptroller's brief in Levitt v. Rocke-
feller as follows:
Amounts shown within an appropriation schedule are estimated costs and are
interchangeable among the several categories.
Brief for appellee at 37.
253 Chief Judge Fuld, dissenting in Hidley, observed:
In other words, while the aggregation of a number of items into a lump sum
hinders the Legislature in exercising its power to reduce or strike out items in
a budget bill, the free interchange provisions eliminate that power in its entirety.
They enable the executive branch, even after a legislative decision has been made,
to directly contravene and override the Legislature's intent by shifting funds
from one item to another.
28 N.Y.2d at 448, 271 N.E.2d at 536, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 694.
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The resurrection of executive supremacy over money bills is
attributable to the combination of a strong executive and the St. Clair
decision. If the executive can control the legislature he may do as he
will since no citizen can challenge the resulting laws whether they
be unconstitutional on their face or not. The sincerity of any legal
theory, aside from St. Clair, supporting such extravagant executive
power seems questionable. The Governor's appropriation bills for
1969-70 and 1971-72 were protected from judicial scrutiny because
of St. Clair.254 In reaching these decisions a majority of the Court
determined that a legislator, seeking an opportunity to exercise his
constitutional duty to strike, reduce, or add items, had no standing.215
251 The 1969-70 fiscal year was involved in Posner v. Rockefeller, 26 N.Y.2d 970, 259
N.E.2d 484, 511 N.Y.S.2d 15 - 1971-72 was involved in Hidley v. Rockefeller, 28 N.Y.2d
439, 271 N.E2d 530, 322 N.Y.S.2d 687. In Posner, Judges Fuld, Breitel and Jasen con-
curred "under constraint of St. Clair." One year later, in Hidley, the constraint was
broken and the three judges dissented.
25526 N.Y.2d 970, 259 NE.2d 484, 311 N.Y.S.2d 15. The court further determined
that the legislator had no standing even if the lump sum bill was still pending when he
sought judicial redress. Following St. Clair, and the abandonment of the procedural ap-
proach previously taken, it became necessary to develop a law of standing, a body of law
which would distinguish the personally aggrieved from the nonpersonally aggrieved.
In the following cases the plaintiff was found to have standing: (1) Levitt v. Rocke-
feller, 69 Misc. 2d 337, 329 N.Y.S.2d 976 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County 1972) (Comptroller held
to have standing to challenge validity of appropriation bills submitted by Governor); (2)
Beaux Arts Prop., Inc. v. United Nations Dev. Corp., 68 Misc. 2d 785, 528 N.Y.S.2d 16
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972) (Dictum indicating that owner of condemned land would
have standing); (3) Semple v. Miller, 38 App. Div. 2d 174, 527 N.Y.S.2d 929 (4th Dep't
1972) (Residents, guardians, and parents of residents had standing to challenge state
action closing school for mentally retarded because of budget cuts); (4) Bloom v. Mayor
of City of New York, 28 N.Y.2d 952, 271 N.E.2d 919, 523 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1971) (City real
property taxpayer has standing to dispute mode of taxation even though state bodies
involved - Judge Scileppi joined the usual three dissenters to form a majority in this
case); (5) Ofenloch v. Gaynor, 66 Misc. 2d 185, 320 N.Y.S.2d 562 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1970), aff'd, 35 App. Div. 2d 913, 317 N.Y.S.2d 267 (2d Dep't 1970) (Citizen-taxpayer
permitted to challenge "lease" between contractor and Board of Cooperative Educational
Services - lower court quoted with approval Chief Judge Fuld's dissent in St. Glair); (6)
Application of Triolo, 65 Misc. 2d 424, 318 N.Y.S.2d 589 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1970)
(Licensed retail liquor store owner had standing to challenge order limiting hours issued
by Albany County Alcoholic Beverage Control Board); (7) Varacchi v. State Univ. of N.Y.
at Stony Brook, 62 Misc. 2d 1003, 310 N.Y.S.2d 751 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1970)
(University day-employee had standing to challenge constitutionality of parking regula-
tions because, having paid parking fee, he was personally aggrieved); (8) Saratoga Harness
Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. Agriculture and Horse Breeding Dev. Fund, 22 N.Y.2d 119, 238
N.E.2d 730, 291 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1968) (Licensed private horseracing corporation heard on
merits in challenge to law requiring payment of "breakage" moneys to Horse Breeding
Fund - court stated that we "shall assume" the plaintiff has standing for the purposes
of reaching the merits, an approach unauthorized by St. Clair); (9) Sleepy Hollow Valley
Comm. v. McMorran, 20 N.Y.2d 190, 229 N.E.2d 52, 282 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1967) (Property
owners had standing to challenge highway deviation by State Superintendent of Public
Works from statutory course); (10) Board of Educ. of Central School Dist. No. 1 v. Allen,
20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791, 281 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1967), aff-d, 342 U.S. 336 (1968) (Local
school board had standing to challenge constitutionality of law authorizing loan of text
books to children in private schools - Judge Keating joined the usual three dissenters to
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form a majority in favor of standing); (11) Byrn v. N. Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp., 31
N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972) (Guardian ad litem for fetuses under
24 weeks gestation in New York City hospitals held to have standing to challenge abor-
tion law, L. 1970 ch. 127); (12) Norwick v. Rockefeller, 70 Misc. 2d 923, 334 N.Y.S.2d 571
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972) (Citizen had standing to challenge legality of legislation
passed pursuant to alleged spurious "message of necessity." N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 14
requiring that bill be upon desks of legislators for 3 days prior to final passage unless
Governor "shall have certified under his hand and the seal of the state, the facts which
in his opinion necessitate an immediate vote"); and (13) Finger Lakes Racing Ass'n v.
New York State Off-Track Pari-Mutuel Betting Comm'n, 30 N.Y.2d 207, 282 N.E.2d 592, 331
N.Y.S.2d 625 (1972) (licensed race-track owners had standing to challenge constitutionality
of offtrack betting law, L. 1970 chs. 143, 144).
In the following cases the plaintiff was found to have no standing: (1) Hidley v.
Rockefeller, 28 N.Y.2d 439, 271 N.E.2d 530, 322 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1971) (Fired state civil
servants could not challenge validity of 1971-72 appropriation bills since "real quarrel is
with the amount of the appropriations, not with the form or method whereby they were
requested or enacted'); (2) Tobin v. Ingraham, 67 Misc. 2d 990, 326 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1971) (Citizen had no standing to require Commissioner of Health to
perform inspections and other statutory duties with respect to migrant labor camps);
(3) Posner v. Rockefeller, 26 N.Y.2d 970, 259 NE.2d 484, 311 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1970) (Assembly-
man has no standing to challenge 1969-70 appropriation bills "and it matters not whether
such bills have been passed by the Legislature or were still pending before that body at
the time the proceeding was instituted"); (4) Glen v. Rockefeller, 61 Misc. 2d 942, 307
N.Y.S.2d 46 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) afJ'd, 34 App. Div. 2d 930, 313 N.Y.S.2d 938 (Ist Dep't
1970) (Citizens, who would be obliged to pay increased transit fare, had no standing to
raise question whether statute required MTA to hold a hearing before imposing such
increase); (5) Filkins v. State, 63 Misc. 2d 380, 311 N.Y.S.2d 154 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County
1970) (Property owners, whose damages were non-compensable, had no standing to chal-
lenge road construction); (6) Nickerson v. Rockefeller, 162 N.YL.J. 61, Sept. 24, 1969 at
15, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County) (Public official had no standing to challenge alleged
corrupt act of Governor); (7) Petition of Robinson, 51 Misc. 2d 480, 273 N.Y.S.2d 450
(Sup. Ct. Albany County 1966) (Citizen had no standing to challenge rules and criteria
promulgated under Medicaid statutes); (8) Donohue v. Cornelius, 17 N.Y.2d 890, 218
N.E.2d 285, 271 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1966) (Plaintiff, who had passed a challenged police exam
and was later dismissed from the department had no standing, as a citizen, to challenge
validity of state police regulations governing promotions and competitive exams); (9)
City of Buffalo v. State Bd. of Equalization and Assessment, 26 App. Div. 2d 113, 272
N.Y.S.2d 168 (2d Dep't 1966) (Mayor of City had no standing to challenge state law
conferring exemption from City tax on railroads); (10) Suffolk County Retail Wine &
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. New York State Liquor Authority, 23 App. Div. 2d 552, 256
N.Y.S.2d 663 (Ist Dep't 1965) (Association of liquor dealers, not a licensee, had no stand-
ing to challenge validity of recently adopt SLA rules and regulations); and (11) National
Ass'n of Harness Drivers v. New York State Racing Comm'n, 57 Misc. 2d 135, 291 N.Y.S.2d
475 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1968) (Association of Harness Drivers had no standing to
challenge different tax treatment of fiat tracks and harness tracks).
The proposed constitution of 1967, which was heavily rejected by the people, con-
mined the following provision in its Bill of Rights, Article I:
§ 2. Any citizen of the State shall have the right to maintain a judicial action
or proceeding against any officer, employer or instrumentality of the state or
political subdivision thereof to restrain a violation of this constitution or the
constitution of the United States, including unconstitutional expenditures.
Whether the citizen's right was to be dependent upon legislative action is not en-
tirely clear.
Secondary material on standing is found at 3 DAvis ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
208-94 (1958); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARv. L. REv. 633 (1971); Davis, The Liberalized
Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 450 (1970); Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Ac-
tions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Bittker, Case of the
Fictitious Taxpayer: The Federal Taxpayer's Suit Twenty Years After Flast v. Cohen,
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The Comptroller is the chief fiscal officer of the state.256 He is
elected by the people at the same general election as the Governor and
Attorney General.257 In early 1972 the Comptroller brought an action
against the Governor seeking a declaratory judgment that the appropri-
ation bills accompanying the 1972-73 Executive Budget were in an
unconstitutional form. The Governor moved to dismiss the complaint
on the grounds, inter alia, of no standing. On March 14, 1972 Supreme
Court Judge Foreman held that the Comptroller had standing and
that an answer should be served so that the merits of the case might
be reached.258 On March 17, 1972 the Comptroller announced that
settlement had been reached whereby the Governor agreed to delete
interchange authority and to itemize the appropriation bills.259 The
case consequently, was dropped.2 60 The immediate collapse of the
Governor's position when the Comptroller was found to have standing
demonstrates that St. Clair was the sole line of defense.261
Laws have been enacted not because they are believed constitu-
36 U. CH. L. Rav. 364 (1969); Davis, Case of the Real Taxpayer: A Reply to Professor
Bittker, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 375 (1969); Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm.
L. REV. 601 (1968) Jaffe, Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The non-Hohfeldian or
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. Rav. 1033 (1968); Lewis, Constitutional Rights and
Misuse of "Standing", 14 STAN. L. REv. 433 (1962); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Re-
view: Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. Rav. 1265 (1961); Davis, Standing to Challenge Govern-
mental Action, 39 MINN. L. REv. 353 (1955); Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions,
37 HARv. L. Rav. 1002 (1924); Note, New York and the non-Hohfeldian Plaintiff Tax-
payers: Standing to Sue the State, 36 ALBANY L. REv. 203 (1971); Note, Standing to Raise
State Constitutional Issues, 31 ALBANY L. REv. 269 (1969); Note, Taxpayer Suits, 69
YALE L.J. 895 (1960).
256 N.Y. CONSr. art. V, § 1.
257 Id.
258 Levitt v. Rockefeller, 69 Misc. 2d 337, 329 N.Y.S2d 976 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer
County 1972).
259 N.Y. Times, March 18, 1972 at 34, col. 1.
260 The case would have presented severe problems for the Court of Appeals. In re-
jecting the Posner suit the court had already held that a public officer, attempting to
perform public duties, had no special claim to standing. Its holding seems directly
applicable to the Comptroller. On the other hand, to hold that the state's chief fiscal
officer has no standing to litigate the constitutionality of budget bills is to court ridicule.
261 At times, the Attorney General's efforts on behalf of the no-standing rule place
a strain on the patience of the people. The assertion that the state's chief fiscal officer
had no standing to challenge the budget bills is one example. Another is the position
taken in Committee for Pub. Educ. and Rel. Liberty v. Rockefeller, 322 F. Supp. 678
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). The Attorney General there sought to block the convening of a three-
judge district court to hear a challenge to a $28 million state appropriation to non-public
schools. The Attorney General urged the doctrine of abstention, i.e., that the federal
courts should not adjudicate the validity of a state statute until the state courts have
had a reasonable opportunity to determine the matter. The court rejected the Attorney
General's claim noting, "this court ought not here abstain, since under the law of New
York plaintiffs have no standing to litigate the state constitutional question in New
York courts" 322 F. Supp. at 688. It seems quite likely that the federal courts will
ultimately intervene if the Court of Appeals continues to adhere to St. Clair. Cf. Posner
v. State of N.Y., 340 F. Supp. 321 (N.D.N.Y. 1972).
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tional but because St. Clair is thought to assure that no court will have
the power to determine their invalidity. The lump sum appropriation
bills are one example. The numerous state guaranteed authorities are
believed to be others. For example, the Constitution and case law are
so clear with respect to the 1960 Housing Finance Agency law that it
is inconceivable that it is based on any sincere legal theory. It and
its successor statutes are based only on St. Clair. In reliance on these
and related statutes some $6 billion of debt have been issued.
CONCLUSION
The Governor and legislature, as well as the courts, have a respon-
sibility to the Constitution. The Constitution is intended to protect
the people against the government. This is obvious in the bill of rights
provisions and is equally true in the fiscal area. State government in
the mid-nineteenth century brought the state to the edge of bankruptcy
by its unrestrained borrowing policies. The debt was paid by taxes
imposed upon the people. But, by the 1846 Constitution, the referen-
dum requirement was added, to assure that in the future, "that when-
ever the people were to have their property mortgaged for a state debt,
that it should be done by their own voice and by their own consent. 262
Subsequent Constitutional Conventions similarly thought they were
engaged in meaningful work and imposed further restraints on the
state's power to borrow. All this was and is futile under St. Clair. A
statute is easily designed to avoid the creation of a "personally ag-
grieved" party. The Attorney General will only rarely have any interest
in having a statute declared unconstitutional. The St. Clair list of
proper parties to raise a constitutional issue is thereby exhausted. If
a citizen cannot claim the protection of the Constitution it is inac-
curate to say that constitutional government exists.
"The distinction between a government with limited and un-
limited powers is abolished if those limits do not confine the
persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and
acts allowed, are of equal obligation."263
The "People's document" should be returned to the people.
262 M. HoFw'i. 1846 CONVENTION 946.
263 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
